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The real estate broker is brought by his calling into a relation
of trust and confidence.  Constant are the opportunities by
concealment and collusion to extract illicit gains.  We know
from our judicial records that the opportunities have not been
lost.1
Over the last twenty years, there have been numerous revi-sions to the law governing the duties of residential real es-
tate agents.  Part of the impetus was provided by two lawsuits in
the early 1990s involving “dual agency,”2 which resulted in settle-
ments totaling $19.9 million.3  The ultimate changes were
substantial.4
This Article provides original empirical evidence showing that
a common assumption underlying these revisions—that, in con-
flicts between their principals and third parties, real estate agents
promote their principals’ interests—is erroneous.  The results in-
form our understanding of the efficacy of the duties the law im-
poses on real estate agents, enhance our understanding of the
efficacy of fiduciary duties generally, and inform our understand-
ing of the proper contours of other legal principles affecting
fiduciaries.
Brokerage firms participating in the sale of residential real es-
tate perform two separate functions: the “listing” and the “sell-
ing.”  These two functions frequently are divided between two
firms.5  The traditional rule in the United States has been that
both firms are fiduciaries of sellers.6  Numerous commentators
have asserted that buyers have misunderstood this principle, er-
1 Roman v. Lobe, 152 N.E. 461, 462 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.), quoted in  Michael
K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry:  A
Proposal for Reform , 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 271, 282 n.63 (1992); Joseph M. Grohman, A
Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker’s Agency Relationship with the Pur-
chaser , 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 560, 586 n.165 (1987).
2 Bokusky v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D. Minn.
Aug. 6, 1993); Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc., No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Dist.
Ct. Minn. June 17, 1993).
3 See infra  note 55.  Brown, Grohman, and Valcarcel state that these lawsuits R
prompted the National Association of Realtors to seek clarification and revision of
the principles governing agent obligations in the sale of residential real estate.  Ron-
ald Benton Brown et al., Real Estate Brokerage:  Recent Changes in Relationships
and a Proposed Cure , 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25, 28 (1995) (stating that Bokusky
and Dismuke  “caused an uproar among brokers” and that the National Association
of Realtors reacted to the cases by proposing various changes during its 1993 annual
convention).
4 See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text. R
5 See, e.g. , infra tbl.1 (finding the agency obligations split between two firms in
1594 of 3209, or 50%, of the sample examined in this Article).
6 See infra  notes 27-28 and accompanying text. R
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roneously believing that brokerage firms performing the selling
functions represent buyers.7  Survey evidence supports this
position.8
This Article does not take issue with the assertion that buyers
and sellers in jurisdictions following the traditional rule, where
selling agents have been subagents of listing agents, have been
misinformed about the duties owed.  Yet implicit in the critical
view of the traditional rule, based on buyers and sellers being
misinformed, is an expectation that the agents comply with their
duties.  Therefore, this Article examines whether agents act in
accordance with their duties along two dimensions: First, we hy-
pothesize that selling agents may secure business by taking ac-
tions that promote the interests of buyers to the detriment of
selling agents’ principals, the sellers, in ways that decrease sales
prices.  Second, we examine whether sellers receive worse sales
prices where the selling and listing functions are divided between
two firms.  Such a relationship would be consistent with selling
agents improperly seeking to promote buyers’ interests, with in-
trafirm relationships restraining that misconduct better than in-
terfirm relationships.
The results of this investigation significantly enhance the cur-
rent understanding of the law governing fiduciaries at two levels.
The first level is focused on residential real estate agents.
Throughout the United States, jurisdictions have tailored the
normal rules of agency in regulating the actions of residential
real estate agents.9  Formulation of the proper contours of that
regulation benefits from understanding the extent to which these
agents comply with applicable duties.
The results of this investigation are also important at a second,
more general level—our understanding of the efficacy of fiduci-
ary duties generally.  Fiduciary duties are, of course, prevalent in
the law, both in agency relationships outside real estate sales and
in other relationships.10  That prevalence makes it desirable for
7 See infra  note 36 and accompanying text. R
8 Gerard R. Butters, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumers’ Experiences with Real Es-
tate Brokers:  A Report on the Consumer Survey of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Investigation  24-26, in L.A. REG’L OFFICE, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY (1983).
9 See, e.g. , infra  notes 57-66 and accompanying text. R
10 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 & cmt. a (1958) (cate-
gorizing an agent as a fiduciary and summarizing the scope of an agent’s duties to
the principal).
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legal scholars to have evidence bearing on the efficacy of the ob-
ligations law imposes on fiduciaries.  Examining compliance with
fiduciary duties in a context where data are available provides
some evidence that may be used to inform our intuition concern-
ing the efficacy of fiduciary duties in other contexts where empir-
ical evidence is not available.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I sum-
marizes the legal duties owed by real estate agents in the sale of
residential real estate.  Next, Part II describes other literature
most pertinent to our investigation.  There is some evidence in
the current literature that real estate agents shirk their duties.
Some of that evidence is based on an examination of prices
where real estate agents sell their own property.  Other evidence
is provided by findings that higher selling commissions are asso-
ciated with higher prices.  There is conflicting evidence concern-
ing the impact that buyers’ brokers have on sales prices, which,
for somewhat complex reasons developed in Part II, is poten-
tially relevant to assessing agent compliance with duties.
No prior work seeks to examine the efficacy of the duties im-
posed on real estate agents by investigating the relationship be-
tween sales price and selling agent specialization.11  Although,
for reasons discussed in Part II, there is some ambiguity, it ap-
pears that no prior work reports results bearing on the efficacy of
duties imposed on agents by directly examining how the division
of agency duties among fiduciaries of the sellers affects sales
prices.  After discussing that literature, Part II develops the con-
ceptual underpinnings of our investigative approach.
Part III then details this new investigation, which examines
sales prices of residential real estate in a jurisdiction at a time
when it followed the traditional rule.  Part III describes the data,
details the model, and presents the results.  The results support
the conclusion that, to secure business, selling agents who are fi-
duciaries of sellers use actions that decrease the returns to their
principals, with some evidence that the participation of a listing
agent in the same firm as the selling agent partially restrains this
activity.  In brief, some economically significant malfeasance is
not restrained by the duties imposed by law.
11 See infra  note 69. R
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I
AGENTS’ DUTIES IN THE SALE OF RESIDENTIAL
REAL ESTATE
Brokerage firms participating in the sale of residential real es-
tate perform a variety of functions.  Before the property is of-
fered for sale, a firm may provide the seller advice concerning
the initial asking price, any repairs to be made to the property
before it is offered for sale, and the description of the property to
be used in any advertising.  After the property is listed, the prop-
erty will be shown to various buyers, typically by agents with the
listing firm and by agents with other firms.  During the marketing
of the property, prospective buyers may benefit from receiving
tailored advice about the property and its suitability to their par-
ticular needs, such as its proximity to schools or other local
services.12
The legal rules governing the duties applicable to agents facili-
tating the sale of residential real estate have garnered significant
attention in legal scholarship.13  Some scholarship examines the
general issue of the transition from principles of caveat emptor to
mandatory disclosure14 and the various theories under which real
12 See, e.g. , Ronald Benton Brown & Thomas H. Thurlow III, Buyers Beware:
Statutes Shield Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Who Do Not Disclose That Properties
Are Psychologically Tainted , 49 OKLA. L. REV. 625, 645 (1996).
13 E.g. , Paula C. Murray, AIDS, Ghosts, Murder:  Must Real Estate Brokers and
Sellers Disclose? , 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 694 (1992).
14 E.g. , Craig W. Dallon, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability and the Effect of
the “As Is” Clause , 54 FLA. L. REV. 395, 396-415 (2002); Serena Kafker, Sell and
Tell:  The Fall and Revival of the Rule on Nondisclosure in Sales of Used Real Prop-
erty , 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 57 (1986); George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclo-
sure Forms:  How the Real Estate Industry Eased the Transition from Caveat Emptor
to “Seller Tell All,”  39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 193 (2004); Katherine A. Pancak
et al., Residential Disclosure Laws , 24 REAL EST. L.J. 291 (1996); Frona M. Powell,
The Seller’s Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial Property , 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 245,
245-63 (1990); Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and
Attempts to Reallocate the Risk , 34 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the transition
away from caveat emptor and the enforceability of agreements selling property “as
is”); Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure Legislation ,
44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381 (1995) (providing a lengthy survey of then-current legisla-
tive developments); Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed? – Doubt-
ing the Demise of Caveat Emptor , 55 MD. L. REV. 387 (1996).
There is conflicting evidence concerning the efficacy of mandatory disclosure.  La-
hey and Redle, reporting results of a survey, find that “45.3% of the respondents
reported discovery of problems after escrow had closed.”  Karen Eilers Lahey &
David A. Redle, The Ohio Experience:  The Effectiveness of Mandatory Real Estate
Disclosure Forms , 25 REAL EST. L.J. 319, 328 (1997).  Additionally, “[96%] of the
responding agents did not view the disclosure form as an effective tool for negotiat-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-3\ORE301.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-FEB-06 13:33
686 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
estate agents can be liable for providing false or misleading infor-
mation or for failing to disclose material information.15  Another
topic that has been particularly fashionable in the legal literature
is an agent’s obligation to disclose certain specific matters: al-
leged paranormal activities;16 the proximity of sexual
ing a reduced price based upon the information disclosed.” Id.  at 332.  They con-
clude that the “purpose [of the mandatory disclosure law] may not be satisfactorily
fulfilled.” Id.  at 330.
Yet two other investigations indicate mandatory disclosure can influence the sales
process in significant ways.  Zumpano and Johnson follow another approach in ex-
amining the efficacy of these disclosure obligations.  Leonard V. Zumpano & Ken
H. Johnson, Real Estate Broker Liability and Property Condition Disclosure , 31
REAL EST. L.J. 285 (2003).  They examine the frequency with which lawsuits were
brought against real estate professionals in a five-state area, focusing on any rela-
tionship with the passage of mandatory property disclosure. Id.  at 285, 291.  They
conclude, “[w]hen states passed such legislation, there was a marked decline in the
number of property related E&O insurance claims.” Id.  at 299.
Moore and Smolen examine the efficacy of mandatory disclosure by comparing
results of surveys of 206 home buyers, 110 surveyed in 1990, most of whom (85%)
did not receive written seller disclosure, and 96 who were surveyed in 1996, most of
whom (90%) did receive written seller disclosure. See  Gary S. Moore & Gerald
Smolen, Real Estate Disclosure Forms and Information Transfer , 28 REAL EST. L.J.
319, 327 (2000).  They find statistically significant decreases from 1990 to 1996 in
both post-transaction buyer complaints and post-transaction buyer dissatisfaction
with construction quality. Id.  at 330-32.  In addition, 19.7% of the buyers in the 1996
survey stated that the disclosure affected price negotiations. Id.  at 335 exhibit 6.
15 E.g. , Dallon, supra note 14, at 415-50; Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 213-25; Paula R
C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer:  Negligence and the Duty to Inves-
tigate , 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 964-84 (1987) (discussing the development of broker
liability in tort for erroneous disclosure or failure to disclose).  Even prior to the
statutory revisions to the law governing real estate agents, see infra notes 57-65 and R
accompanying text, some authority approved various theories that were grounded
on a duty owed by real estate brokerage firms to a nonprincipal buyer. See infra
note 31. R
16 E.g. , Brown & Thurlow, supra  note 12, at 626-27; Murray, supra note 13, at 708 R
(arguing against requiring disclosure to satisfy “a buyer’s peculiarities, sensitivities,
and prejudices”); Daniel M. Warner, Caveat Spiritus:  A Jurisprudential Reflection
upon the Law of Haunted Houses and Ghosts , 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 232-45
(1993).
Discussion of this topic was precipitated by Stambovsky v. Ackley , 572 N.Y.S.2d
672, 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (reinstating purchaser’s cause of action to rescind the
sale of a house for nondisclosure of a reputation of paranormal activity, where seller
“deliberately fostered the public belief that her home was possessed”). See gener-
ally  Mark Schlueb, Church Street Ghosts Haunt Lease Lawsuit , ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL, Sept. 8, 2005, at A1 (“The owners of Amura Japanese Restaurant say they
don’t want to move into a renovated building at Church Street Station because it’s
haunted, according to a lawsuit filed by the building’s landlord.”).  The current New
York statutory authority governing disclosure is N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443-a (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 2005) (eliminating need to volunteer that “the property is, or is sus-
pected to have been, the site of a homicide, suicide or other death by accidental or
natural causes, or any crime punishable as a felony”) and N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
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predators17—a matter that has given rise to reported opinions in
New York,18 Ohio,19 and Texas20—or noisy neighbors;21 notori-
§§ 462, 465 (obligating sellers to complete a disclosure form but limiting damage for
failure to provide the form to $500). See generally  Malach v. Chuang, 754 N.Y.S.2d
835, 846 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002) (holding all remedies provided by N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW §§ 462, 465, other than the $500 remedy, unenforceable for vagueness).
17 E.g. , Philip Lucrezia, New York’s Property Condition Disclosure Act:  Extensive
Loopholes Leave Buyers and Sellers of Residential Real Property Governed by the
Common Law , 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401, 425-28 (2003) (discussing disclosure of
the proximity of sex offenders); Shelley Ross Saxer, “Am I My Brother’s Keeper?”:
Requiring Landowner Disclosure of the Presence of Sex Offenders and Other Crimi-
nal Activity , 80 NEB. L. REV. 522, 556-61 (2001); Tracey A. Van Wickler, H.B. 2564:
The Real Estate Disclosure Act Threatens Arizona’s Children with Becoming
“Megan” Victims , 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 367, 390 (2000) (discussing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-2156 (2002), which contains no obligation to disclose that property sold is
“located in the vicinity of a sex offender,” and arguing that prospective buyers
should be given greater access to this information); Flavio L. Komuves, Comment,
For Sale:  Two-Bedroom Home with Spacious Kitchen, Walk-in Closet, and Pervert
Next Door , 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 668, 696-707 (1997); Thomas D. Larson, Com-
ment, To Disclose or Not to Disclose:  The Dilemma of Homeowners and Real Estate
Brokers Under Wisconsin’s “Megan’s Law,”  81 MARQ. L. REV. 1161, 1182-99 (1998).
18 Glazer v. LoPreste, 717 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257-58 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (affirming
dismissal of claims concerning nondisclosure of a convicted sex offender in the
neighborhood, notwithstanding allegations that the sellers and their agents repre-
sented that the house was “a good place to raise children,” on the basis that, inter
alia, the statement was an opinion and that proof of an intent to deceive was absent).
19 Spinelli v. Bair, No. 1999CA00399, 2000 WL 34335853, at *1-2, *5 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 3, 2000) (affirming summary judgment for the sellers on claims alleging
fraud and negligence in the sale of a house for failure to disclose prior criminal
actions that allegedly previously occurred on the property on the basis that the his-
tory “was not material to the transaction because a psychological stigma is not a
material defect” and the buyers “knew of the . . . history several days prior to closing
on the property”); Van Camp v. Bradford, 63 Ohio Misc. 2d 245, 249-50, 259-60
(Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1993) (denying seller’s motion for summary judgment on
claim that the seller, who stated that a break-in had occurred sixteen years earlier,
fraudulently induced the sale by omitting reference to recent rapes on and near the
premises). See generally STATE OF OHIO, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, RESIDENTIAL
PROPERTY DISCLOSURE FORM 4 (2004), available at  http://www.com.state.oh.us/real/
realform.htm (stating that the “[o]wner makes no representations with respect to
any offsite conditions” and referencing the buyer’s ability to obtain information con-
cerning the state’s sex offender registration).
20 Sanchez v. Guerrero, 885 S.W.2d 487, 489, 492 (Tex. App. 1994) (affirming a
judgment for the buyers of a house in which the seller had allegedly molested sev-
eral children, where the agent falsely stated that he did not know the seller’s iden-
tity).  Texas law currently subjects to discipline a real estate agent who makes a
“material misrepresentation to a potential buyer concerning a significant defect, in-
cluding a latent structural defect, known to the license holder that would be a signifi-
cant factor to a reasonable and prudent buyer in making a decision to purchase real
property,” with a similar prohibition on omissions of that information when known
to the agent. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1101.652(b)(3)-(4) (Vernon 2004 & Supp.
2005).  The Texas Occupations Code specifically provides, however, that a real es-
tate agent need not disclose that “a death occurred on a property by natural causes,
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ous crimes having occurred on the premises;22 and the AIDS sta-
tus of occupants.23  Of course, disclosure of more mundane
matters, such as environmental issues, has also been examined.24
This Article focuses on another controversial part of the duties
of real estate agents that is more prominent in practice than some
suicide, or accident unrelated to the condition of the property.” Id.  § 1101.556(2).
A Texas administrative rule provides that “[a] real estate broker or salesperson has a
special obligation to exercise integrity in the discharge of the licensee’s responsibili-
ties, including employment of prudence and caution so as to avoid misrepresenta-
tion, in any wise, by acts of commission or omission.”  22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 531.2
(West, Westlaw through Oct. 31, 2005).  This rule was in effect at the time of Sanchez
v. Guerrero  except for changes making the language gender-neutral implemented in
1998.  23 Tex. Reg. 1568 (Feb. 20, 1998).
21 E.g. , Marianne M. Jennings, Buying Property from the Addams Family , 22
REAL EST. L.J. 43, 48-49 (1993); Roberts, supra  note 14, at 9. R
22 See, e.g. , Brown & Thurlow, supra  note 12, at 629-44 (providing a summary of R
the disclosure obligations in thirty states); Murray, supra  note 13, at 698-701; R
Warner, supra note 16, at 232-45; Ronald Basso, Note, Reed v. King: Fraudulent R
Nondisclosure of a Multiple Murder in a Real Estate Transaction , 45 U. PITT. L. REV.
877 (1984) (discussing Reed v. King , 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)); cf.
Jennings, supra note 21 (discussing disclosure of assorted circumstances, including R
crime, having potential psychological impact). Reed v. King , 193 Cal. Rptr. 130,
which reversed the dismissal of a complaint seeking rescission of and damages for a
sale of a house where the seller failed to disclose the house had been the site of a
multiple murder ten years previously, gave rise to this scholarship. See generally
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1710.2 (West 1998) (limiting the obligation to disclose deaths on
the premises and their manner that occurred more than three years previously and
the obligation to disclose an occupant’s AIDS status).
23 E.g. , Brown & Thurlow, supra  note 12, at 629-44 (providing a summary of the R
disclosure obligations in thirty states); id.  at 647 (recommending future legislation
governing the matter provide for disclosure that “psychologically stigmatizing events
will not be disclosed”); Murray, supra  note 13, at 694-98, 701-07; Warner, supra note R
16, at 234-45; Ross R. Hartog, Note, The Psychological Impact of AIDS on Real R
Property and a Real Estate Broker’s Duty to Disclose , 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 757, 773
(1994) (advocating mandatory disclosure); Michael D. Isacco, Jr., Note, A Massa-
chusetts Real Estate Broker’s Duty to Disclose:  The Quandary Presented by AIDS
Stigmatized Property , 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1211 (1993).
This list of matters giving rise to disputes in residential real estate transactions is
intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
24 See, e.g. , Frank B. Cross & Paula C. Murray, Liability for Toxic Gas in Residen-
tial Home Sales , 66 N.C. L. REV. 687, 722-24 (1988) (examining potential liability in
fraud); Paul A. Locke & Patricia I. Elliott, Caveat Broker:  What Can Real Estate
Licensees Do About Their Potentially Expanding Liability for Failure to Disclose
Radon Risks in Home Purchase and Sale Transactions? , 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 71,
110-14 (2000) (proposing strategies to protect real estate professionals); Joanna L.
Guilfoy, Note, Home Not-So-Sweet Home:  Real Estate Broker Liability in the Sale
of Previously Contaminated Residential Property:  Has Broker Liability Gone Too
Far? , 21 RUTGERS L.J. 111 (1989); Robert Kwong, Comment, Fraud and the Duty to
Disclose Off-Site Land Conditions:  Actual Knowledge vs. Seller Status , 24 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 897 (1997) (examining disclosure of off-site environmental
problems, focusing on New Jersey law).
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of the more piquant subjects of potential disclosure—whose in-
terests real estate agents promote.25  At the root of this contro-
versy is the ability to divide the listing component (advice given
before the property is listed and advice on similar matters, e.g.,
whether a seller should reduce the asking price or accept an of-
fer) and the selling component between two different real estate
brokerage firms.  Although the firm providing the listing ser-
vices, the “listing brokerage firm,” is selected by the seller, it is
the buyer who typically identifies the “selling brokerage firm”—
the firm responsible for showing the house to the buyer.
Before statutory revisions in the 1990s,26 general principles of
agency law, supplemented by the terms of a local multiple listing
service, commonly governed the activities of real estate agents
assisting in the sale of residential property in the United States.27
The typical default rule produced by following these principles in
the sale of residential property included in a multiple listing ser-
vice treated a brokerage firm selling another firm’s listing as a
subagent of the listing firm and thus a fiduciary of the seller.28
25 Grohman, supra note 1, at 563 n.17; Valerie M. Sieverling, The Changing Face R
of the Real Estate Professional:  Keeping Pace , 63 MO. L. REV. 581, 581-82 (1998);
cf., e.g. ,  Patricia A. Wilson, Nonagent Brokerage:  Real Estate Agents Missing in
Action , 52 OKLA. L. REV. 85, 88 (1999) (noting confusion concerning the duties
owed).
26 See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. R
27 Braswell & Poe, supra  note 1, at 272, 277-78 (providing a relatively thorough R
analysis of the issue).
28 See, e.g. , D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § 1.5, at
1:17, § 1.6.1 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 2006); Braswell & Poe, supra  note 1, at 274-78; R
Brown et al., supra  note 3, at 34; Dallon, supra note 14, at 415-16; Grohman, supra R
note 1, at 561-63; Murray, supra note 15, at 948-49; Katherine A. Pancak et al., Real R
Estate Agency Reform:  Meeting the Needs of Buyers, Sellers, and Brokers , 25 REAL
EST. L.J. 345, 346-48 (1997); Matthew M. Collette, Note, Sub-Agency in Residential
Real Estate Brokerage:  A Proposal to End the Struggle with Reality , 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 399, 406-18 (1988) (providing a detailed discussion of authority). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5 cmt. d (1958) (“[T]he subagent stands in a
fiduciary relation to the principal . . . .”). Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co. of
Colorado , 736 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1987), is commonly cited for this proposition. See,
e.g. , Braswell & Poe, supra  note 1, at 284-85; Brown et al., supra note 3, at 37 & R
n.37; Dallon, supra note 14, at 415 & n.113; Grohman, supra note 1, at 565-66; Pan- R
cak et al., supra , at 349; Collette, supra , at 410-12; Brett L. Hopper, Comment, The
Selling Real Estate Broker and the Purchaser:  Assessing the Relationship , 1992 BYU
L. REV. 1135, 1145 & n.41 (1992).  Braswell and Poe note that in the early 1990s, a
number of jurisdictions also had express statutory provisions providing for the sell-
ing agent to be a subagent of the listing agent, absent an express contrary agree-
ment.  Braswell & Poe, supra  note 1, at 291. R
Where these principles apply, the fact that a purchaser was a real estate profes-
sional could be viewed as inherently creating agency conflicts. See, e.g. , Frisell v.
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This treatment was not universal, however.29  Some decisions
Newman, 429 P.2d 864, 866, 869 (Wash. 1967) (determining internal multiple listing
service rules did not alter traditional principle under which the selling brokerage
firm, one of whose employees was a joint purchaser, was a fiduciary of the seller).
See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.86.020 (West 2002) (currently providing,
as a default, that “[a] licensee who performs real estate brokerage services for a
buyer is a buyer’s agent”).  Yet some authority held that a buyer’s financial interest
in the selling brokerage firm would not cause the buyer to become an undisclosed
agent. See, e.g. , Lageschulte v. Steinbrecher, 344 N.E.2d 750, 752-55 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (affirming both (1) a trial court’s conclusion that a buyer under a contract to
purchase land had met the standards required to be awarded equitable relief and (2)
the award of specific performance to the buyer, who owned the selling brokerage
firm that received a portion of the commission, even though the seller was unaware
of the relationship when the contract was formed); Zoda v. Eckert, Inc., 674 P.2d
195, 198-200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (purchaser, who was also a real estate agent, was
not liable to the seller for failure to inform the seller of the purchaser’s interest as a
real estate agent, and the purchaser was not a “selling agent,” even though a portion
of the commission was ultimately paid to the purchaser).
One commentator describes the development of the subagency framework some-
what derisively.  Sandra Nelson asserts, “In the 1970s, Bill North, general counsel for
the National Association of Realtors, ‘concocted the unilateral offer of subagency’
in order to maintain the exclusiveness of realtor multiple listing services (MLS)
without violating antitrust laws.”  Sandra Nelson, Note, The Illinois Real Estate
“Designated Agency Amendment”:  A Minefield For Brokers , 27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 953, 961-62 & n.64 (1994) (quoting “an Illinois attorney well-versed in agency
law and very well acquainted with the Designated Agency Amendment, who wishes
to remain anonymous”).
29 See, e.g. , Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 270-71 (Ala. 1977) (holding, in
connection with a sale “treated as if it were a multiple listing” in which the selling
agent allegedly advised the buyers that the asking price was excessive, that whether
the selling agent was an agent of the buyers was a question of fact for the jury);
Buffington v. Haas, 601 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Ariz. 1979) (stating, in a lawsuit concerning
the selling agent’s failure to provide in the contract of sale that the seller would have
a mortgage to secure deferred payments, “[i]n the usual situation where one real
estate broker secures a listing to sell real estate and another broker presents a buyer
who makes an offer for the listed property, an agency relationship between the seller
and the broker who presents a buyer is not established”); Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d
207, 208, 210 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (granting listing brokerage firm summary judg-
ment in claim seeking to hold that firm liable for alleged misrepresentations of the
selling agent); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 475-76 (Iowa 1985) (holding that
selling agent for a house under construction included by another firm in a multiple
list was, as a matter of law, an agent of the buyers). See generally  Grohman, supra
note 1, at 589 (“When one examines the legal principles for finding an implied R
agency in the typical real estate transaction, one recognizes that all of the elements
necessary for an agency relationship exist between the selling broker and the pur-
chaser.”).  Some of the principles articulated in those jurisdictions have been subse-
quently modified or addressed by statute or administrative rule. See, e.g. , ALA.
CODE § 34-27-82 (2002) (providing for agency, subagency, dual agency, and transac-
tion brokerage and establishing that agency relationship shall not be created absent
a written agreement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (1997) (requiring written dis-
closure of whom a licensee represents); IOWA CODE §§ 543B.62-.63 (1997) (pre-
empting application of the common law and stating that “[a] licensee is not
considered to be a subagent of a client of another licensee solely by reason of mem-
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focused on particular circumstances as a basis for reaching a dif-
ferent conclusion.30  In addition, some decisions built on theories
other than fiduciary relationships as bases to impose liability on a
brokerage firm or agent.31
bership or other affiliation by the licensee in a multiple listing service or other simi-
lar information source, and an offer of subagency shall not be made through a
multiple listing service or other similar information source”); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
§ R4-28-1101(A) (Westlaw, current through  Sept. 30, 2004) (requiring a licensee to
“deal fairly” with nonclients); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 193E-11.3(1)(a) (Westlaw, cur-
rent through Iowa Administrative Bulletin, Volume XXVII, Number 23, May 25,
2005) (requiring disclosure in listing agreement of terms under which other agents
may cooperate); see also  Fisher v. Comer Plantation, Inc., 772 So. 2d 455, 464 n.5
(Ala. 2000) (declining to give retroactive application to legislation regulating real
estate agency).
30 ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW § 293, at 349 (1987).
For example, Illinois authority held that a selling agent may be the buyer’s agent
where the agent was contacted concerning a particular piece of property. See
Stefani v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 65, 68-69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (reversing
the dismissal of a count, stating that even where the agent was not initially contacted
concerning particular property, the agent’s subsequent statements and participation
in the contracting could create a buyer agency). See generally Messler v. Phillips,
867 P.2d 128, 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court determination that real
estate agent breached a duty of care after the agent, who had the listing of the plain-
tiff’s property, created the duty by advising the plaintiff that she would represent the
plaintiff’s interests at a simultaneous closing of the plaintiff’s purchase of another
property for which the agent was the listing agent); GAUDIO, supra , § 293, at 346-47
(describing a buyer’s agent as one employed “to find and arrange the purchase of
property meeting certain specifications”).  Illinois subsequently altered its principles
governing real estate professionals. See  225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 454/15-10 (West
Supp. 2005) (providing as a default that “[l]icensees shall be considered to be repre-
senting the consumer they are working with as a designated agent for the con-
sumer”); id.  at 454/15-5 (stating legislative intent to abrogate application of common
law agency principles to real estate brokers and salespersons).
31 Even if a real estate firm is not the agent of a prospective buyer, it may owe
various duties to the prospective buyer.  The source of this duty may be identified as
state licensing requirements or a categorization of real estate brokerage as being in
the nature of a public service enterprise. See Murray, supra note 15, at 960-64.  For R
example, assorted authority construing agent duties before the statutory revisions of
the 1990s examines competition between agents and purchasers. See, e.g. , Funk v.
Tifft, 515 F.2d 23, 24-26 (9th Cir. 1975) (construing Idaho law to order transfer to
prospective purchasers of property purchased by an affiliate of the selling agent
where the selling agent, after mailing the prospective purchasers’ offer, had outbid
the prospective purchasers without notice to them); Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d
136, 139-40 (Conn. 1955) (seller’s agent, who gave false information to both the
seller and the prospective buyer in order to acquire a portion of the offered property
for himself at a bargain price, obligated himself to convey the portion he had bought
to the buyer of the other portion of the premises upon payment of the remainder of
what the buyer originally offered for the whole); Stevens v. Jayhawk Realty Co., 677
P.2d 1019, 1025 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (holding president of listing brokerage firm
not a fiduciary of a prospective buyer and therefore not liable to a prospective buyer
for being a principal in making a competing offer on commercial property), aff’d ,
689 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1984); Allen v. Lindstrom, 379 S.E.2d 450, 456 (Va. 1989) (re-
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A real estate professional in a traditional agency relationship
with a buyer or seller is obligated to “procur[e] the greatest ad-
vantage to his client.”32  Some examples preceding the statutory
revisions of the last decade illustrate the contours of the duties
this relationship imposes on a real estate professional acting as
an owner’s fiduciary.  The agent cannot properly advise a pro-
spective buyer of the lowest price the owner would take.33  Addi-
jecting the creation of a private cause of action for the prospective buyer against a
real estate professional for violation of an administrative rule obligating the real
estate professional to forward offers to sellers); Klotz v. Fauber, 189 S.E.2d 45, 45
(Va. 1972) (determining that the rule in other jurisdictions that seller’s real estate
agent “is liable to a prospective buyer when the agent fails to transmit the prospec-
tive buyer’s offer and buys the property for his own account at a price equal to or
less than the price the prospective buyer agreed to pay” will not be extended in that
jurisdiction to create a cause of action applicable where there is not an allegation
that the agent’s price was not equal or more than what the prospective buyer/plain-
tiff offered); GAUDIO, supra  note 30, § 293, at 349 (stating that where a selling agent R
receives an offer, fails to transmit it, and purchases the property for himself, “[t]he
courts generally hold in these cases that the broker has breached his fiduciary duty
of loyalty and disclosure to the buyer”).
Some of this authority has been superseded or refined by legislation or adminis-
trative rule. See, e.g. , IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-2086 (2003) (requiring that, in per-
forming ministerial acts to assist a buyer or seller whom a real estate professional
does not represent, the professional act “with honesty, good faith, reasonable skill
and care”); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2130, -2131(B) (West 2001) (“Unless a licensee
enters into a brokerage relationship with [the] person, it shall be presumed that such
person is a customer of the licensee rather than a client,” and requiring licensees to
“treat all prospective buyers honestly”); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 20-325d-2 (West,
Westlaw through Nov. 8, 2005) (agency disclosure form stating, “[a]ll real estate
agents, whether representing you or not, are obligated by law to treat all parties to a
real estate transaction honestly and fairly,” which furthers CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-
314(a) (West 1999), restricting the grant of licenses to “persons who bear a good
reputation for honesty, truthfulness and fair dealing”).  This discussion of authority
is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.  Reference may be made to Olaza´bal’s
work for a recent survey of the law. See  Ann Morales Olaza´bal, Redefining Realtor
Relationships and Responsibilities:  The Failure of State Regulatory Responses , 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 65, 100-10 (2003).
32 Vogt v. Town & Country Realty of Lincoln, 231 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Neb. 1975).
See generally NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2417 (1996) (codifying the duties of a seller’s
agent).
33 See, e.g. , Rohauer v. Little, 736 P.2d 403, 408 (Colo. 1987) (“Information con-
cerning the lowest price a seller might accept would clearly be useful to a prospec-
tive purchaser, but the disclosure of that information to the purchaser by a broker or
salesperson would not be in the seller’s interests since it would clearly enable the
purchaser to avoid ‘over-bidding.’  . . . On the other hand, disclosure to the pur-
chaser of this information would clearly render the broker or salesperson liable to
the seller for breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.”); cf.  Haymes v. Rogers, 222
P.2d, 789, 789-90 (Ariz. 1950) (holding that it was a jury question whether an agent
had forfeited his right to a commission by stating to buyers who ultimately pur-
chased property for $8,500 that they might be able to purchase at that price property
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tionally, these duties would be violated by an agent who
possessed two different offers but revealed to the owner only the
worse (less favorable) one.34  The agent’s unauthorized disclo-
sure of personal circumstances obligating the owner to sell
quickly also would be prohibited.35
The typical traditional legal treatment (selling firm subagency)
has been criticized as not reflecting the expectations of the par-
ties.36  Support for that criticism is provided by a widely cited37
survey prepared for the Federal Trade Commission in 1983.38
That survey reports the beliefs of buyers and sellers of previously
occupied homes concerning whom the agents were representing.
Where the individual responsible for acquiring the listing, called
the “listing agent,” and the individual agent acting on behalf of
the selling brokerage firm, called the “selling agent,” were differ-
ent individuals, 74% of the buyers believed that the selling agent
represented the buyer.39  In those sales, only 8% of the buyers
believed that the selling agent represented the seller.40  Consis-
tent with this belief, 80% of the buyers in the survey indicated
that an agent “played a major role in negotiating with the seller
or the seller’s agent,”41 and 62% indicated that an agent “told
[the buyer] how low [the agent] thought the seller would go.”42
Seventy-three percent of the buyers told an agent the highest
price they would pay; 82.5% felt that this information would be
listed at $9,500); BURKE, supra  note 28, § 7.2, at 7:6 (describing Haymes v. Rogers  as R
“the leading case”); see also infra  note 61 and accompanying text. R
34 Mason v. Bulleri, 543 P.2d 478, 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
35 Beckwith v. Clevenger Realty Co., 360 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Ariz. 1961) (holding
agent unable to recover commission because he advised the buyer that the seller was
in bad health and wanted to sell quickly).
36 See, e.g. , Braswell & Poe, supra  note 1, at 277; Grohman, supra  note 1, at 573- R
79 (noting, inter alia, that the selling agent may recommend a home inspection firm
and a title company to the buyer and summarizing assorted authority); Pancak et al.,
supra  note 28, at 349-50; Molly Moore Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Lia- R
bility:  Arizona’s Emerging Malpractice Doctrine , 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767, 772-73
(1978); Collette, supra  note 28, at 419, 423; cf. Braswell & Poe, supra note 1, at 273 R
(identifying the concern that agents will reveal to sellers secrets buyers tell them).
37 Dallon, supra  note 14, at 416; see, e.g. , Collette, supra  note 28, at 419 n.103. R
38 Butters, supra note 8.  A survey for the California Department of Real Estate R
examining the significance of conflicts of interest in real estate sales preceded this
report by a few years. CAL. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ASSOCS., INC., DUAL AGENCY
PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1981).
39 Butters, supra  note 8, at 24-25.
40 Id.  at 25.
41 Id.  at C-25.
42 Id.  at C-24.
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kept confidential.43
Another survey, one of 265 Georgia real estate professionals,
also identifies various ways in which agents did not promote the
interests of sellers.44  The respondents estimated that when a sell-
ing agent knew the highest price a buyer would pay, only half the
time would the selling agent forward that information to the list-
ing agent.45  Additionally, the respondents estimated that a sell-
ing agent who knew the lowest price a seller would accept would
tell the buyer this information 48% of the time.46  These activities
can obviously decrease the prices realized by sellers and, where
unauthorized, can violate agents’ duties.
A 1993 survey for the National Association of Realtors sug-
gests that ten years after the first survey, a substantial portion of
home buyers continued to be uninformed.47  It found that only
“65% of home buyers . . . either had knowledge or were in-
formed of agency representation by the first contact with the
agent with whom they were working.”48
Brown, Grohman, and Valcarcel note49 that concern over the
contours of these legal principles was heightened in 1993 by two
Minnesota cases: Dismuke v. Edina Realty, Inc. ,50 and Bokusky
v. Edina Realty, Inc .51  Both cases involved “dual” agency, where
Edina Realty simultaneously represented the buyers and the sell-
ers.52  The sellers in Dismuke ,53 and both the buyers and the sell-
43 Id.  at C-25.
44 Jay N. Ball & Hugh O. Nourse, Testing the Conventional Representation Model
for Residential Real Estate Brokerage , 3 J. REAL EST. RES. 119 (1988).
45 Id.  at 125 & exhibit 4.  A contemporaneous judicial opinion indicates that, at
that time, it was the general understanding that Georgia followed the traditional
rule, i.e., selling agent subagency.  Jim Royer Realty, Inc. v. Moreira, 363 S.E.2d 10,
13 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (Deen, P.J., concurring) (“As explained by the Stortroen
court, and as understood and practiced by the real estate industry in this state until
now, the legal consequence of a multiple listing arrangement is that the selling bro-
ker or agent is an agent of the listing broker and subagent of the seller.  This is an
unequivocal, hardfast, and workable rule, something definite and concrete that bro-
kers, agents, sellers, and buyers can chew on.”).
46 Ball & Nourse, supra  note 44, at 125 exhibit 4.
47 See  Pancak et al., supra note 28, at 353 (discussing the 1993 survey by the Na- R
tional Association of Realtors).
48 Id.
49 Brown et al., supra  note 3, at 28. R
50 No. 92-8716, 1993 WL 327771 (Dist. Ct. Minn. June 17, 1993).
51 No. 3-92 CIV. 223, 1993 WL 515827 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1993).
52 Id.  at *1; Dismuke , 1993 WL 327771, at *1.
53 1993 WL 327771 at *1.
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ers in Bokusky ,54 challenged the adequacy of the disclosure
made by Edina Realty of the dual capacity in which it had acted.
Brown, Grohman, and Valcarcel state that those cases, which
were ultimately settled for a total of $19.9 million,55 prompted
the National Association of Realtors to seek clarification and re-
vision of the principles governing agency in the sale of residential
real estate beyond the narrow issue of the disclosure required in
a dual agency.56
In response to these and other factors, statutory changes to the
principles governing actions of residential real estate profession-
als have been either proposed or adopted since the early 1990s in
many states.57  Some jurisdictions now provide that absent an
agreement to the contrary, a salesman working with the buyer is
the buyer’s agent.58  Other jurisdictions created what Professor
Olaza´bal calls a “two-tiered” model in which a brokerage firm
owes heightened duties to “clients” and some lesser level of obli-
gations to mere “customers.”59  A decrease from the normal fi-
duciary duties can also arise in a jurisdiction whose law
contemplates the creation of a “transaction” brokerage relation-
ship, which may but need not be the default relationship.60
54 1993 WL 515827 at *1.
55 The claims in federal court were settled for $12.3 million (plus an additional
$1.7 million to persons who had additional relationships with an affiliated title firm
or an affiliated bank).  Scott Carlson, Plaintiffs Win Cash in Agency Case , CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 12, 1995, at 7V.  The settlement of the claims brought in state court,
which was valued at $5.9 million, included coupons for discounts on future services
from Edina Realty and options to purchase stock of Edina Realty’s former parent
company.  Neal Gendler, Edina Realty Suit Checks Received:  Federal Suit Payment
Mailed; State Suit Payment Coming in Early 1996 , STAR TRIB., Dec. 23, 1995, at 1D.
56 Brown et al., supra  note 3, at 28-29.  Judicial decisions imposing liability for R
nondisclosure similarly prompted the National Association of Realtors to seek statu-
tory revision of the law governing property disclosure. See Dallon, supra note 14, at R
428; Lahey & Redle, supra note 14, at 322; Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 197, 213-14, R
218, 250; Katherine A. Pancak  et al., Residential Disclosure Laws:  The Further De-
mise of Caveat Emptor , 24 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 310 (1996); Washburn, supra  note 14, R
at 383; Leroy Gatlin II, Note, Reforming Residential Real Estate Transactions:  An
Analysis of Oklahoma’s Disclosure Statute , 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 735, 743
(1997); Carolyn L. Mueller, Legislative Note, Ohio Revised Code Section 5302.30:
Real Property Transferor Disclosure—A Form Without Substance , 19 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 783, 786 (1994). See generally L.A. REG’L OFFICE, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
supra note 8, at 98 (“State officials have offered the opinion that virtually no pro- R
posed legislation relating to real estate has a chance of passage unless it is approved
by the state association of Realtors.”).
57 Pancak et al., supra  note 28, at 353. R
58 Olaza´bal, supra note 31, at 93 (noting certain exceptions in three states). R
59 Id.  at 85-87.
60 Id.  at 96 (identifying five states as providing transaction brokerage as the de-
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In codifying the duties owed by real estate professionals, a
number of jurisdictions have expressly prohibited unauthorized
disclosure by a real estate professional representing a seller of
the seller’s willingness to accept less than the listed price61 or the
seller’s motivation for selling.62  Some jurisdictions also have
sought to provide expressly some limited set of duties owed to
nonprincipals.63  Other jurisdictions simply enhanced obligations
to disclose the nature of the parties’ legal relationships.64
Olaza´bal notes that states now generally mandate some disclo-
sure about agency relationships.65  She states:
A major, if not the primary, impetus for agency disclosure
laws is the danger that consumers may be unaware that the
agent with whom they are working is actually an agent for the
other party.  The concern is that it is possible, if not likely, that
a buyer will reveal his top offer (or a seller his lowest accept-
able price) to a licensee who has a fiduciary obligation to con-
vey that information to the other party to the transaction.66
Enhanced disclosure focuses on agents’ legal obligations.  The
concern underlying increased agency disclosure, of course, fo-
cuses on misinformed buyers.  Putting aside cases of dual agency,
sellers will not likely be harmed by a misunderstanding of the
fault).  Pancak, Miceli, and Sirmans note that an October 1993 survey for the Na-
tional Association of Realtors (NAR) found that 72% of sellers believed that
professionals acting as nonagent transaction facilitators should receive lower com-
pensation than agents.  Pancak et al., supra  note 28, at 357.  They also note that, R
based on this and other factors, an NAR Presidential Advisory Group recom-
mended that the NAR should not promote the nonagent-transaction-facilitator con-
cept. Id.  at 357-58.
61 See, e.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-61-804(2)(a), -805(2)(a) (2004) (providing
corresponding obligations on agents representing sellers and buyers, respectively);
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-10-10(b)(1) (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. &
PROF. §§ 17-528(h)(1), -532(c)(2) (West 2002) (providing for obligations on agents
representing sellers and buyers, respectively); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-28-303(b)(i), -
304(b)(i) (2005) (providing for obligations on agents representing sellers and buyers,
respectively).
62 See, e.g. , COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-61-804(2)(b), -805(2)(b) (providing for obli-
gations on agents representing sellers and buyers, respectively); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 25-34.1-10-10(b)(2) (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. §§ 17-
528(h)(3), -532(c)(2) (West 2002) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-28-303(b)(ii), -
304(b)(ii) (2005) (same).
63 Olaza´bal, supra  note 31, at 101-02.  Pancak, Miceli, and Sirmans provide a R
somewhat older fifty-state survey of the law.  Pancak et al., supra  note 28, at 373-77 R
tbl.1.
64 Pancak et al., supra  note 28, at 353. R
65 Olaza´bal, supra  note 31, at 112; accord  Dallon, supra  note 14, at 416; Pancak et R
al., supra  note 28, at 353. R
66 Olaza´bal, supra  note 31, at 113-14. R
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applicable law.  This is because an agent selected by a seller will
not owe fiduciary duties to the buyer; it is only buyers who select
agents who owe fiduciary duties to opposing parties.
This Article provides original evidence that allows an assess-
ment of the current regulation of residential real estate agency
on a number of dimensions.  Requiring enhanced disclosure of
agency obligations is sensible if real estate agents act in accor-
dance with their legal obligations.  If they do not, however, there
is less value to enhancing the understanding buyers and sellers
have of the duties imposed by law; in fact, enhanced disclosure
may be counterproductive.  The survey evidence indicating that
buyers in traditional jurisdictions believed selling agents repre-
sented buyers67 and the 1988 survey of real estate professionals’
beliefs concerning customary practices68 raise the possibility that
the agents frequently have not complied with the applicable du-
ties.  That evidence, however, does not quantify the impact, if
any, of agent malfeasance.  One issue our empirical investigation
addresses is whether real estate agents act in ways having a quan-
tifiable adverse impact on their principals.  More generally, the
fashioning of the rules governing residential real estate agents, or
agents of all types, may benefit from an enhanced understanding
of the extent to which agents do not heed their fiduciary duties.
II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTIGATING
PERFORMANCE OF AGENT DUTIES
This Article examines two aspects of how real estate agents
perform their fiduciary duties in a regime in which agents for-
mally owe fiduciary duties to sellers: (1) whether the participa-
tion of a selling agent who specializes in selling is associated with
a worse outcome for the principal (the seller), and (2) whether
agency duties are performed better where all agents are within
the same firm.  The general contours of the hypotheses being in-
vestigated are as follows:  Selling agents have incentives to devi-
ate from their duties to sellers.  Actions that help buyers, at the
expense of sellers, can be used to secure business because failure
to promote the interests of a buyer can cause a buyer to change
the agent with whom the buyer is working.  It is also possible that
67 See supra  note 40 and accompanying text. R
68 See supra  notes 45-46 and accompanying text. R
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relationships within brokerage firms may restrain this miscon-
duct.  This analysis yields two predictions that can be tested em-
pirically:  First, the participation of a selling agent who specializes
in selling will be associated with a lower sale price.  Second, a
seller may realize a lower sales price where the selling agent is
with a firm that is not the listing brokerage firm.
A. Prior Investigations
Our investigation appears to be the first directly examining our
first hypothesis—selling agent specialization and whether acts in-
consistent with agent obligations can be used to secure busi-
ness.69  There is, however, some existing evidence bearing on the
second hypothesis.  Before turning to a more detailed develop-
ment of our empirical modeling, it is helpful to put our investiga-
tion in context by reviewing the results of some of the rich
existing empirical literature examining real estate agency.70
1. Return to the Agent
It would be anomalous to expect real estate agents to be im-
pervious to variations between their personal interests and the
best interests of their principals, i.e., to be impervious to
“agency” problems.71  Recent evidence provides one example:  A
69 Our initial results were discussed with Professor Geoffrey Turnbull, who, with
Professor Jonathan Dombrow, subsequently was able to find results confirmatory of
ours in a different sample using a different modeling technique.  Geoffrey K.
Turnbull & Jonathan Dombrow, Identifying Agent-Specific Influences in the Bro-
kerage Process 15-17, 33 (Feb. 22, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thors).  Their sample, from January 1996 through September 1997, does not directly
address the issue of compliance with fiduciary duties because a statutory change in
the middle of the period they study eliminated a statutory provision providing sub-
agency as a default. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1467(A) (West, Westlaw LA-
STANN95 Database through 1994 Fourth Extraordinary Session) (“Notwithstanding
the provisions of Civil Code Arts. 2985 through 3034 or any other provisions of law,
a licensee engaged in any real estate transaction is the agent or subagent of the seller
unless there is a written agreement to the contrary and that agreement is disclosed
to all parties.”), amended by  H.B. 200, 1997 Leg., Reg. Sess., 1997 La. Acts 32.
70 An excellent survey of the literature is provided in John D. Benjamin et al.,
What Do We Know About Real Estate Brokerage? , 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 5 (2000).
71 J.D. House provides anecdotal evidence of agency problems:
The customers’ needs are taken into account.  Of course, only up to a
point.  After all, it’s his decision. . . . If you looked at five or six houses and
then decided on one and asked me if it was good, I’d be a fool not to say
yes, even though I’d never buy it for myself.
J.D. HOUSE, CONTEMPORARY ENTREPRENEURS:  THE SOCIOLOGY OF RESIDENTIAL
REAL ESTATE AGENTS 5-6 (1977) (quoting a manager at a Canadian firm).
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study of 98,038 house sales in the Chicago area72 finds that agents
selling their own houses realize 3.7% higher sales prices com-
pared to other sales.73
Another basic aspect of agency problems is whether the fees
paid to agents affect their performance—in the absence of
“agency” problems, agent compensation would not influence
agent performance.  Zietz and Newsome find some evidence that
increasing the selling agent’s commission increases the sales
price, particularly in sales of small- to medium-sized houses.74
Thus, there is some evidence of agency problems in the acts of
selling agents that can be mitigated by increasing their commis-
sion rates.
Two prior works examine the structure of listing agent com-
pensation.  Interesting results are found by Munneke and Yavas,
who examine sales prices of houses listed with a firm (a RE/
MAX affiliate) that allows the individual agent with the listing to
keep an unusually large portion of the listing component of the
72 Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, Market Distortions When Agents Are Better
Informed:  The Value of Information in Real Estate tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11053, 2005).
73 Id.  at 19.
74 Joachim Zietz & Bobby Newsome, Agency Representation and the Sale Price of
Houses , 24 J. REAL EST. RES. 165, 186-87 (2002).  The listing brokerage firm typi-
cally shares between 40% and 60% of the total commission with the selling broker-
age firm.  Thomas J. Miceli, The Multiple Listing Service, Commission Splits, and
Broker Effort , 19 AREUEA J. 548, 549 tbl.1 (1991) (reporting that, in sales of used
residential property, 69.1% of the sales involved commission splits in that range); see
also PATRICK J. ROHAN ET AL., REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 2.02[1] (2005) (“These ‘internal splits’ vary among firms, communities, and accord-
ing to market conditions.  Typically they range from ten percent to thirty percent to
the listing broker, forty percent to sixty percent to the selling broker or cooperating
firm, and the remainder to the firm.  They are also frequently progressive—that is,
as a broker produces more listings or more sales per year, the percentage he or she
receives increases.  A successful broker who sells his or her own listing can some-
times receive seventy percent of the total commission.”); Joachim Zietz & Bobby
Newsome, A Note on Buyer’s Agent Commission and Sale Price , 21 J. REAL EST.
RES. 245, 246 (2001) (stating that an equal split is usual).
The causation, however, could go the other way.  Consider a property that has
been on the market for some time.  The seller may convince the listing agent to
decrease the commission when the seller drops the asking price. See generally
Thomas J. Miceli, Renegotiation of Listing Contracts, Seller Opportunism and Effi-
ciency:  An Economic Analysis , 23 REAL EST. ECON. 369, 371 (1995) (noting that
during the negotiation of an extension of a listing agreement, an owner may seek to
negotiate a lower commission); cf., e.g. , Guild Mgmt. Co. v. Oxenhandler, 541
S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (involving a defendant who attempted to renegoti-
ate the broker’s commission on commercial property when it became clear a sale
would realize less than the originally contemplated asking price).  One coauthor per-
sonally experienced this phenomenon.
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commission (95% in that case); i.e., in this location, only 5% of
the listing portion of the commission is kept by the listing broker-
age firm.75  They find no statistically significant relationship be-
tween sales price and either the listing being with that firm or
with the fact that the agent was the principal of the listing bro-
kerage firm and, therefore, effectively did not share the
commission.76
There is, however, some evidence that agents shirk their duties
when they have exclusive agency but are not given the exclusive
right to sell (meaning no commission is owed on a sale arranged
by the owner).  Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas find that use of
this form of contract (exclusive agency) for moderately priced
houses results in lower sales prices compared to sales where the
commission is earned regardless of who arranges the sales.77
That suggests agents use less diligence under exclusive agency
contracts compared to their efforts for listings providing an ex-
clusive right to sell.  Use of less diligence would be inconsistent
with fulfilling their contractual duties (unless, of course, either
they had contracted to provide lesser diligence, which the au-
thors of that article do not reference and which seems implausi-
ble, or they provide in exclusive-right-to-sell listings more service
than they are obligated to provide).
A final example involves sales where the listing agent and the
selling agent have a positive prior personal relationship.  This is
pertinent because it may show how a nonmonetary increase in an
agent’s utility affects the agent’s performance.  Halpern found
that the sales prices in transactions in which there was a positive
relationship78 between the agents were $11,390 further from (i.e.,
75 Henry J. Munneke & Abdullah Yavas, Incentives and Performance in Real Es-
tate Brokerage , 22 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 5, 5 (2001). See generally  RE/MAX
Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1001, 1003 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating, “Re/
Max requires that its franchisees adopt the ‘Re/Max 100% Concept’ which allows
real-estate sales agents to receive 95% to 100% of their share of sales commissions,”
and examining an alleged antitrust violation arising from other brokerage firms allo-
cating 20 to 25 percentage points less of the commission to the selling firm when the
selling agent was a Re/Max agent).  Munneke and Yavas state that the shared por-
tion typically is between 40% and 60%.  Munneke & Yavas, supra , at 5.
76 Munneke & Yavas, supra note 75, at 15, 16 tbl.3. R
77 Ronald C. Rutherford et al., The Impact of Contract Type on Broker Perform-
ance:  Submarket Effects , 26 J. REAL EST. RES. 277, 295 exhibit 4 (2004).
78 She defines a positive relationship as one where the agents had jointly partici-
pated in at least one prior transaction, had known each other at least five years, and
had viewed the relationship as “positive.”  Jennifer J. Halpern, The Effect of Friend-
ship on Decisions:  Field Studies of Real Estate Transactions , 49 HUM. REL. 1519,
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less than) the original listing price compared to transactions
where there was not such a relationship.79  The results were sig-
nificant at the 10% level.80  However, because Halpern examined
only thirty-two house sales,81 it is difficult to draw firm conclu-
sions from her investigation.
In sum, there is some evidence that the sales process is influ-
enced by agent shirking or other malfeasance.  Higher prices are
received where real estate agents are selling their own houses.
There is some evidence that selling agents do not always put
forth their normal level of diligence.  Evidence for this is pro-
vided by findings that increased commissions can yield increased
prices and that agents may not work as hard where sellers have
retained the right to compete in selling.  However, we do not
have evidence that internal compensation arrangements within a
listing brokerage firm affect pricing.
2. Buyers’ Brokers
Another way to review compliance with duties imposed on
agents is to examine the consequences of the use of a buyer’s
broker (i.e., an agent owing duties to the buyer).  The theory is
that if agents comply with their duties, the use of a buyer’s bro-
ker will yield a lower price than the use of an agent owing duties
to the seller.82  Prior investigations of the consequences of the
use of a buyer’s broker provide ambiguous results.  Elder,
1531 tbl.1 (1996).   Her sample was limited to transactions involving two agents in
different offices. Id.  at 1527.  Her investigation, therefore, does not bear on intraof-
fice relationships.
79 See id.  at 1531.  There is some ambiguity in that article concerning the size of
the price differential.  The article states that the mean difference between listing
price and sales price was $20.26 in sales where the agents were business friends and
$8.87 where the agents were “unacquainted.” Id.  at 1531.  She reports a t-statistic of
1.70. Id.  An accompanying table in the article reports average sales prices for
houses of $225.00 and $286.60. Id.  at 1532 tbl.2.  The average sales price of the
houses in the area at the time examined was approximately $300,000. Id.  at 1524-25.
It appears, then, that Halpern’s article states those dollar amounts ($20.26 and
$8.87) in thousands.
80 Id. at 1531.
81 Id. at 1526-27.
82 See generally Grohman, supra  note 1, at 588 (“Presumably, the purchaser rep- R
resented by a broker should fare better in negotiations for the purchase of prop-
erty.”). But see generally  Collette, supra  note 28, at 419 (“Assuming brokers act R
according to their beliefs and expectations, one must conclude that cooperating bro-
kers actually negotiate on behalf of their buyers.  This conclusion is supported by
empirical evidence.” (citing L.A. REG’L OFFICE, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
8)). R
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Zumpano, and Baryla provide a direct investigation, examining
the relationship between sales prices and the use of buyers’ bro-
kers in a nationwide survey of house purchases.83  They found no
statistically significant change in sales prices in transactions
where buyers’ brokers are used compared to sales where all bro-
kers represent the sellers.84  That is the result that would be ex-
pected if selling agents owing fiduciary duties to buyers fully
disregarded their duties and promoted buyers’ interests (and ac-
ted as if they were buyers’ brokers).
A second approach, taken by Curran and Schrag, examines
changes in house prices following a statutory change that in-
creased the frequency with which buyers’ brokers were used.85
Reviewing residential sales prices in the Atlanta area from 1993
to 1995, they found that, following the effectiveness of such a
statutory change,86 there was a negative, generally statistically
83 Harold W. Elder et al., Buyer Brokers:  Do They Make a Difference?  Their
Influence on Selling Price and Search Duration , 28 REAL EST. ECON. 337 (2000).
84 Id.  at 356 tbl.5, 357.  Black and Nourse also find no statistically significant rela-
tionship between sales price and the participation of a buyer’s broker.  Roy T. Black
& Hugh O. Nourse, The Effect of Different Brokerage Modes on Closing Costs and
House Prices , 10 J. REAL EST. RES. 87, 95 exhibit 2, 96 (1995).  These results are not
particularly persuasive, however, because they examined a set of only eighty house
sales. Id.  at 93.  As could be expected, the ninety-five percent confidence interval
for their estimated impact of the use of a buyer’s broker includes economically sig-
nificant relationships, in the range of -$13,900 to $10,486 (computed as: -1707 ± 2.0 x
(-1707/-0.28)), compared to the average house price—$146,140 in their sample. See
id.  at 93 & exhibit 1.
Black and Nourse do, however, find that in the purchase of relatively more expen-
sive houses, the use of a buyer’s broker is associated with lower cash charges at
closing. Id.
85 Christopher Curran & Joel Schrag, Does It Matter Whom an Agent Serves?  Evi-
dence from Recent Changes in Real Estate Agency Law , 43 J.L. & ECON. 265 (2000).
Less formal evidence is provided in a third approach by Brown, Grohman, and Val-
carcel.  They discuss a survey made of 232 relocating employees of a particular firm,
which reported that those who engaged buyers’ brokers paid, on average, 91% of a
home’s list price, whereas those using traditional agents paid 96.5% of the list price.
Brown et al., supra note 3, at 44; see also  Carla A. Fried, House Hunting?  Save by R
Hiring Your Own Broker , MONEY, Apr. 1993, at 20 (reporting the results of the
survey).  Their discussion, however, does not provide any indication of any statistical
significance of that finding, nor does it identify the extent to which the survey con-
trolled for other attributes. See Brown et al., supra note 3, at 44. R
86 Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transactions, 1993 Ga. Laws 376 (codi-
fied as amended at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-6A-1 to -16, 43-40-25 (West, Westlaw
through 2005 Special Sess.)) (providing, inter alia, that multiple listing membership
will not by itself create a subagency and that absent a written agreement, “[a] broker
who performs services under a brokerage engagement for another is a limited
agent”—a limited agent not subject to traditional fiduciary duties).  The statutory
change was effective January 1, 1994. Id.  Of course, sales activity will span the
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significant predicted decrease in houses priced over $175,000,
with the predicted decreases for houses priced under $175,000
not statistically significant.87  They assert the results “suggest that
the change in Georgia’s real estate law improved buyers’ relative
bargaining power in their negotiations with sellers, particularly in
the market for relatively expensive homes.”88
Our investigation does not seek to resolve the tension between
these two articles.  Rather, these articles collectively provide
some evidence that the duties imposed on real estate agents for
the benefit of their principals may affect how real estate agents
perform their duties,89 which provides context to our
investigation.
3. Division of Agent Duties Between Firms
One prior investigation fully reports results examining the con-
effective date for some houses.  To identify sales under the former regime, they use a
dummy variable showing the impact for sales closed before April 1, 1994.  Curran &
Schrag, supra  note 85, at 275.
87 Curran & Schrag, supra  note 85, at 281 & tbl.2.
88 Id.  at 282.
89 One might criticize these investigations on a number of bases.  Consider first
the work of Elder, Zumpano, and Baryla.  As a statistical matter, the absence of a
statistically significant relationship does not mean that there is not a relationship; it
simply means that the confidence interval being used includes zero.  For example, in
estimating the logarithm of the sales price, they find an estimated coefficient of -0.02
for the presence of a buyer’s broker, with a t-statistic of 0.74.  Elder et al., supra
note 83, at 356 tbl.5.  Assuming, as the magnitudes of their coefficients suggest, that R
they used the natural logarithm, the corresponding estimated impact of the use of a
buyer’s broker from this evidence is almost $3,000 for a house otherwise selling at
$150,000.  That result is computed as follows:  ln(150,000) = 11.9184; e 11.8984 =
147,031.  (This represents only a rough (in this case, a biased) estimate; the method-
ology for providing an unbiased estimate is described infra  note 128).  Moreover, R
sales prices corresponding to the 95% confidence interval are in the range of
$139,441 to $155,034—a very wide range containing economically significant devia-
tions from $150,000 (the range is computed as follows: e 11.9184 - 0.02 ± [1.965(0.02/0.74)]).  Their
study, then, does not allow one to reject the existence of price impacts that are eco-
nomically significant.
Other concerns might be raised with Curran and Schrag’s analysis.  They examine
house prices in Atlanta for the period from July 1993 through June 1995.  Curran &
Schrag, supra note 85, at 273.  The statistical problem is that, as they note, id.  at 275 R
n.20, this type of empirical analysis cannot segregate the impact of other changes in
the market that occur at the same time as the statutory change.  For example, At-
lanta hosted the 1996 Summer Olympics.  The area’s preparations for that event or
anticipated inconvenience arising from associated crowds could have affected hous-
ing prices.  Thus, Curran and Schrag’s evidence does not really allow one to reach a
conclusion concerning whether a selling agent’s performance is affected by the role
(buyer or seller) of the party who is the selling agent’s principal.
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sequences of dividing agent duties between two firms,90 which is
one of the two matters we investigate.  Zietz and Newsome ex-
amine a set of 1334 home sales from mid-1999 through mid-2000
in the Orem/Provo, Utah, area.91  Their article is not entirely
clear concerning some of the specifics of their investigation; some
detail is therefore required in explaining their investigation to
give a sense of the reasons why their article may be considered to
be ambiguous.
Zietz and Newsome trifurcate their sample of sales into the
following three categories: sales where only one agent is in-
volved,92 sales where two agents with one firm are involved,93
and sales involving two agents from two different firms.94  We are
interested in how agents perform their fiduciary duties to their
principals.  In the third case, where two brokerage firms are in-
volved, they describe the selling agent as “the buyer’s agent,”95
which seems to imply that the selling agent owes some height-
ened duties to the buyer.  And they indicate that the transactions
they examine are governed by what they call the “designated
agency principle,”96 which they distinguish from “the phased-out
agency/subagency representation.”97  Utah law, however, in this
90 Zietz & Newsome, supra  note 74.  In addition, Levitt and Syverson ran regres-
sions estimating price with independent variables that included the presence of two
agents and the presence of two agents with the same firm.  Levitt & Syverson, supra
note 72, at 18.  They do not, however, report the estimates for both coefficients; they
only report the former. Id.
Tangentially relevant work has been done by Jud and Winkler, who, in examining
sales prices of a sample of houses, bifurcate house sales based on whether the listing
firm is the selling firm.  G. Donald Jud & Daniel T. Winkler, What Do Real Estate
Brokers Do:  An Examination of Excess Returns in the Housing Market , 3 J. HOUS-
ING ECON. 283, 287, 291 tbl.II (1994) (finding a positive, statistically significant rela-
tionship between sales price and the listing and selling offices being the same).
Those results are not directly relevant to our inquiry because they treat as
equivalent sales involving two agents in the same firm and sales involving only one
agent.
91 Zietz & Newsome, supra  note 74, at 168. R
92 This circumstance includes one they describe as follows:  “only listing agent is
involved in sale, no buyer’s agent.” Id.  at 171 exhibit 1.
93 They describe this circumstance as one where the broker is a “limited dual bro-
ker.” Id.  at 167.  In this case, the “buyer’s agent and listing agent come from the
same firm.” Id.  at 169 (defining the variable “BASFIRM,” which they use to indi-
cate this circumstance).
94 See id.  at 167.
95 Id.  at 169.
96 Id.  at 166.
97 Id.  at 167.  The language provides (in full):  “Designated agency representation
has been challenged on the grounds that, in everyday practice, buyers have gained
little if anything relative to the phased-out agency/subagency representation.” Id.
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time period continued to allow selling agent subagency.98  Unfor-
tunately, Zietz and Newsome are not explicit in identifying how
they determine to whom selling agents in their sample owed du-
ties.  Because their article does not describe how they determine
(whether by reviewing the local multiple listing service agree-
ment, by reviewing the documents from actual transactions, or by
some other means) that the set of transactions in their sample
excludes those where a selling agent represented the seller as a
subagent, there is some uncertainty concerning what they actu-
ally investigate.
Zietz and Newsome’s results are significant in setting the con-
text of our investigation, however, whether or not their sample
includes selling agents owing fiduciary duties to sellers.  They
find in sales of medium-to-large houses a negative, statistically
significant relationship between sales price and the participation
of two agents within the same firm compared to the participation
of two agents with different firms.99  They estimate the magni-
tude of the price impact at 3.7%.100  They do not find statistically
significant results for other-sized houses101 or for all houses
generally.102
These results are somewhat puzzling.  It is not clear why sepa-
rating the duties between two firms should produce higher sales
prices.  One possibility is that the selling agents in their sample
sought to represent buyers, and their familiarity with agents
within their own firms allowed them to bargain more effectively
against listing agents in the same firms.103
If Zietz and Newsome’s description of their data is accurate,
and the selling agents were supposed to represent buyers, this
interpretation of their results does not imply a violation of fiduci-
98 See UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 162-6-1.11.4 (2000) (imposing specified disclosure
and other obligations on selling agents who act as subagents of sellers).
99 See  Zietz & Newsome, supra  note 74, at 178 exhibit 3, 185.
100 Id.  at 185.
101 See id.  at 178 exhibit 3.
102 See id.  at 174 exhibit 2.
103 Their favored interpretation is that “the agents . . . act to pressure the seller to
give in to a lower sale price.” Id.  at 185.
Their interpretation of part of their results is curious.  They assert, “For all . . . size
classes [other than medium-to-large houses], the firm affiliation of buyer’s and list-
ing agents makes no difference to the sale price.” Id.  at 185.  This is, of course,
inaccurate as a statistical matter.  The absence of a statistically significant relation-
ship does not prove that there is not a relationship; rather, it merely means that the
95% confidence interval (or some other interval if a confidence level other than 5%
is used) includes zero.
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ary duties.  It would mean, however, that Zietz and Newsome’s
evidence does not address our second hypothesis concerning per-
formance of selling agents who owe fiduciary duties to sellers.
B. The Theory of This Investigation
A traditional tool for aligning the interests of agents with those
of their principals is the adoption of compensation contingent
upon the outcome.104  Selling brokerage firms typically receive a
fee based on a percentage of the sales price,105 which might ap-
pear to align the incentives of selling brokerage firms and their
agents with the interests of sellers.  However, it is not novel to
note that the magnitude of the fee customarily charged in real
estate sales—typically in the range of 6%-7%,106 with only a por-
tion going to each of the listing agent and the selling agent107—
may be insufficient to align agents’ incentives with those of the
sellers.  For example, if the selling brokerage firm and its employ-
ees received a total of 3% of the sales price, an increase in sales
price of $5,000 would only increase their fees by $150.  Except in
the sale of very expensive homes, increases in the number of
transactions in which an agent participates are more likely to be a
source of increased commission revenue than actions taken in a
particular sale that increase the sales price.108  The use of per-
104 See, e.g. , Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements:
Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards , 36 J.L. &
ECON. 503 (1993).
105 See supra  note 74 and accompanying text. R
106 See, e.g. , CARYL A. YZENBAARD, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
§ 2:15 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 2005); cf. BURKE, supra note 28, § 2.3.1 (5%- R
7%).  Although rates in this range are typical, various factors may cause variations.
See, e.g. , William C. Goolsby & Barbara J. Childs, Brokerage Firm Competition in
Real Estate Commission Rates , 3 J. REAL EST. RES. 79, 83 (1988) (finding that
“[h]igher-valued houses are sold with lower commission rates”); C.F. Sirmans &
Geoffrey K. Turnbull, Brokerage Pricing Under Competition , 41 J. URBAN ECON.
102, 116 (1997) (finding empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that “a
decline in the demand for houses relative to supply tend[s] to increase the equilib-
rium [real estate agent] commission rate”).  Moreover, there currently is substantial
competitive pressure on this business model from discount brokers—competition
that may be enhanced by access to information through the Internet. See generally
James R. Hagerty & Ruth Simon, Realtor Commissions Face New Pressure , WALL
ST. J., May 10, 2005, at D1 (discussing, inter alia, discount brokers and commission
rebate practices); Jennette Smith, Discount Brokerages Gain Popularity Among
Home Sellers , CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Nov. 3, 2003, at 24 (discussing discount
brokers).
107 See supra  notes 74-75 and accompanying text. R
108 Levmore makes an interesting observation concerning an advantage of uni-
form commissions.  He notes that an agent having uniform commissions (e.g., all
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centage compensation thus may not assure that selling agents
comply with the fiduciary duties owed to sellers.  These suspi-
cions are confirmed by prior literature discussed above109 indi-
cating that agency problems affect selling agents.
This Article supplements the current understanding of whose
interests selling agents promote by investigating two statistical
relationships.  One involves agent specialization.  The basic prin-
ciple is that deviation from fiduciary duties may facilitate a sell-
ing agent in securing business.  In the marketing of houses by a
selling agent whose principal is the seller, there is not an express
obligation that binds a prospective buyer to continue to work
with a particular selling agent.  Prospective buyers may contact
several agents.110  A selling agent may keep a prospective buyer’s
allegiance by providing valuable information or other services.
Providing some of these services may be consistent with the
agent’s duties to the prospective seller, e.g., the prompt relaying
of inquiries to the seller or the listing agent and providing posi-
tive, factually accurate public information.  On the other hand, a
selling agent may provide a prospective buyer with information
where doing so is inconsistent with promoting the seller’s inter-
ests, e.g., by providing information that need not be disclosed
and whose disclosure decreases the ultimate sales price.  For ex-
ample, in order to keep a customer, a selling agent may advise a
prospective buyer that a prospective seller may be willing to ac-
cept a lower price or that a particular house is, in the agent’s
opinion, overpriced.  Prospective buyers typically will be very in-
terested in making sure they are not looking at overpriced
houses, and a selling agent who refuses to identify overpriced
houses may lose customers.
On this theory, this Article examines the relationship between
sales price and whether the selling agent specializes in acting as a
selling agent.  Real estate agents will vary in the extent to which
they are willing to disregard the duties imposed on them by law
in order to secure business.  An empirical investigation of a juris-
diction where selling agents typically are supposed to represent
houses listed with it are at 6%) “mitigates the problem of conflicts among principals
because joint revenue maximization is much more certain if an agent receives similar
compensation from several principals.”  Levmore, supra note 104, at 505. R
109 See supra  notes 71-74 and accompanying text. R
110 See Moshe Adler, Disclosure and the Buyer-Broker Relationship , REAL EST.
REV., Winter 1982, at 94, 99 (discussing the frequency of contacts with multiple
agents).
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sellers may find that the participation of a selling agent who spe-
cializes in selling is associated with lower prices.  That finding
would support the view that selling agents secure business by ad-
versely affecting the prices realized by sellers—their principals.
The second approach to investigating agent performance in-
volves examining the number of brokerage firms involved in
each transaction.  The basis of this approach is to find a circum-
stance that might inhibit agents in deviating from the duties im-
posed by law.  A focus on the importance of interpersonal
relationships (discussed above)111 suggests that a selling agent is
less likely to take a position contrary to the seller if the selling
agent is in the same firm as the listing agent.  For example, a
selling agent may be more reluctant to tell a prospective buyer
that a house is overpriced if the listing agent is in the same firm.
Such an observation may be implicitly critical of the listing agent;
it might imply that the listing agent secured the listing by indicat-
ing that the agent could secure an unrealistically high price.  Co-
operation with agents in other firms also may be important.
However, an agent generally may be expected to deal more fre-
quently with another agent in the same firm than with a particu-
lar agent in another firm.112  An agent, therefore, may be more
hesitant to criticize implicitly another agent in the same firm for
fear of poisoning an important relationship.  Consequently, we
would find support for the view that selling agents who are fidu-
ciaries of sellers promote the interests of buyers if we find that
the separation of the listing and selling duties between two firms
is associated with lower sales prices.
III
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF SELLING
AGENT PERFORMANCE
A. Data
To assess real estate broker performance in a traditional juris-
diction, this Article examines a sample of 3209 single-family
dwelling sales during 1995 in a particular portion of a single met-
ropolitan statistical area (MSA).  As was the case in a number of
111 See supra  notes 78-79 and accompanying text.  For example, a selling agent R
may steer a prospective buyer away from houses listed with disfavored brokers.
L.A. REG’L OFFICE, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra  note 8, at 185. R
112 See generally HOUSE, supra  note 71, at 59-60, 64-67 (discussing cooperation R
between agents within a firm and “incipient cliques”).
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jurisdictions in the 1990s,113 the jurisdiction had a statute provid-
ing that absent a written agreement to the contrary, a selling
agent was the subagent of the listing agent and thus an agent of
the seller.
A review of a sample of transactions indicates that, during
1995 in this portion of the MSA, it was unusual for the parties to
deviate from the default relationship provided by law.  We ran-
domly selected 437 transactions in which the largest firm in the
multiple listing service (MLS) participated in some capacity, and
for each, we reviewed the documents on file with that firm to
determine whether a buyer’s broker was involved.  We could
classify only 11, or 2.5%, of the transactions as involving the par-
ticipation of a buyer’s broker.  Three, or 0.7%, additional trans-
actions may have involved a dual agency, although the
documents reviewed raise a significant suggestion that the parties
erroneously completed the forms.  In four other transactions, or
0.9%, the purchaser was, or was a relative of, the selling agent.
In six additional transactions, or 1.4%, it appeared that no
buyer’s broker was involved, although various levels of inconsis-
tency in the fashion in which the forms were prepared raise some
uncertainty.
The local MLS reported 4227 single-family dwelling sales dur-
ing 1995.  In addition to listing and selling brokerage firm infor-
mation, the data contain dwelling and market characteristics.
This set of transactions was first reduced to 3899 transactions in
which there was a single listing agent and a single selling agent.
In 3209 of the transactions, the MLS reported all information
necessary for our models.
Prices of housing within the MSA vary tremendously, reflect-
ing the different neighborhoods, ranging from opulent dwellings
(which need not be large) to very modest accommodations lack-
ing central heat.  Only some of these variations are reflected in
the dwelling characteristics reported by the MLS.  The portion of
the MSA covered by the MLS has been divided into a number of
different MLS areas.  The housing within six of these MLS areas
is more homogeneous, i.e., the prices of the dwellings in these
neighborhoods are more closely correlated with those aspects of
the improvements that are identified by and reported by the
MLS.  The 3209 transactions were then reduced to 1247 transac-
tions, consisting of all transactions within those six MLS areas.
113 See supra  note 28. R
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, as reported by the MLS, of
the dwellings included in the sample of 3209 transactions and the
subsample of 1247 transactions within those six MLS areas.  Re-
flecting the greater uniformity of housing within those six MLS
areas, the standard deviation of the sales prices for dwellings
within those six MLS areas was $51,296, while the standard
deviation of the sales prices for all 3209 transactions was $71,387.
There are many real estate brokerage firms operating in the
portion of the MSA covered by the MLS.  One hundred nine
firms participated as listing brokerage firms in the subset of 3899
transactions reported by the MLS for 1995 that involved no more
than one listing agent and no more than one selling agent.114
Within the MLS, the real estate brokerage business is somewhat
concentrated.  The five firms that acted most frequently on the
selling side participated in that capacity in 28%, 5%, 5%, 5%,
and 4% of the transactions.  The five firms that acted as the list-
ing brokerage firm most frequently did so in 31%, 6%, 5%, 4%,
and 4% of the transactions.  The same firm led in both catego-
ries.  On the other hand, twenty-three brokerage firms acted as
the selling brokerage firm in only one of these 3899 transactions,
and fourteen acted as the listing brokerage firm in only one of
those transactions.
Because we hypothesize that specialization as a selling agent
may be related to how agents fulfill their duties,115 we compiled
participation statistics for each individual real estate agent.  Nine
hundred fifty-three individual agents were a listing agent or a
selling agent in one or more transactions.  For each of these indi-
vidual agents, we computed the number of times the agent was
either a listing agent or a selling agent in a transaction reported
by the MLS in 1995, a statistic we call the agent’s level of partici-
pation .  For example, if the agent acted as a selling agent on the
sale of one house and the listing agent on the sale of a second
house, that agent’s level of participation equals two.116  A second
114 All offices of a firm located within the MSA (based on the trade name used by
the firm, as reported through the MLS) are considered as one firm for purposes of
this Article, with offices geographically located outside the MSA considered as dif-
ferent firms.
115 See supra  Part II.B.
116 The computations of the level of agent participation in transactions are based
on all 4227 transactions reported by the MLS, including those in which more than
one agent acted as the listing agent or the selling agent.  In sales where there are two
listing agents, neither of whom is a selling agent for the transaction in question, the
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agent who acted as both the listing agent and the selling agent in
a single house sale also would have a level of participation equal
to two.  During 1995, there was a wide range of frequencies with
which individual agents participated in sales reported by the
MLS.  The highest level of agent participation was 192.  Only 5%
(47) of the agents achieved a level of participation greater than
27, while the participation of 20% (191) of the agents was not
more than one.  The level of participation of 60% (578) of the
agents was less than seven.
For each agent, we computed a fraction representing the por-
tion of that aggregate number of transactions accounted for by
that agent’s participation as a selling agent.  If that fraction is
greater than or equal to 0.75, the agent is categorized in our in-
vestigation as “specializing” as a selling agent.  If the fraction is
less than or equal to 0.25, the agent is categorized as “specializ-
ing” as a listing agent.117  This definition is not affected by
whether the agent attempts to hold himself out to the public as
specializing as a listing agent or a selling agent.
B. Empirical Methodology
1. Primary Modeling of Agent Specialization and Separation
of Duties Between Two Firms
To examine whose interests selling agents promote and the dif-
ferent impacts intrafirm and interfirm agent relationships have
on the sales process, we prepared ordinary least squares regres-
sions estimating the natural logarithm of sales price (quoted sales
price less concessions) of each house in the data set based on
property-specific characteristics reported by the MLS and listing
agent and selling agent characteristics.  The functional form of
the initial model (Model 1) is:
lnP  = constant + b1 dwelling age + b2 dwelling age 2 + b3 living
area + b4 days on market + b5 1/[1+days on market ] + b6 fireplace
+ b7 tenant  + b8 no air  + b9 no heat  + b10 carport  + b11 garage  +
b12 two brokerage firms  + b13 one agent + b14 ln(selling agent’s
participation level) + b15 ln(listing agent’s participation level) +
transaction increases by 0.5 the level of participation of each listing agent, with a
corresponding computation for transactions that involve two selling agents.
117 The description of this computation is rendered somewhat complex because an
agent may participate as both the selling agent and the listing agent in respect of the
sale of a particular house.
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b16 selling agent specializes in selling + b17 listing agent participates
in listing  + e,
where:
lnP  is the natural logarithm of the sales price (less
concessions)
dwelling age  is the age of the dwelling, in years
dwelling age 2 is the dwelling age, squared
living area  is the living area, in square feet
days on market  equals the time from listing to the property
being under contract, in days
1/[1+days on market ] equals the reciprocal of 1 + days on
market
fireplace  equals 1 if the property has at least 1 fireplace, 0
otherwise
tenant  equals 1 if the property is nonowner occupied, 0
otherwise
no air  equals 1 if the property has no central or window air
conditioning, 0 otherwise (included only in those models estimat-
ing price of all 3209 transactions, because all properties in the
subsample have air conditioning)
no heat  equals 1 if the property has no central heat, 0
otherwise
carport  equals 1 if the property has a carport, 0 otherwise
garage  equals 1 if the property has a garage, 0 otherwise
two brokerage firms  equals 1 if the listing brokerage firm is not
the selling brokerage firm, 0 otherwise
one agent  equals 1 if the listing agent and the selling agent are
the same individual, 0 otherwise
ln(selling agent’s participation level) equals the natural loga-
rithm of the selling agent’s level of transaction participation
ln(listing agent’s participation level) equals the natural loga-
rithm of the listing agent’s level of transaction participation
selling agent specializes in selling equals 1 if at least 75% of the
selling agent’s participation level arose from transactions where
the agent acted as a selling agent, 0 otherwise
listing agent participates in listing  equals 1 if no more than 25%
of the listing agent’s participation level arose from transactions
where the agent acted as a selling agent, 0 otherwise
aˆi  is the coefficient in the model for the i th independent
variable.
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Model 3 estimates the same relationship in the full sample.
The importance of most of the independent variables that con-
trol for property attributes is self-explanatory.  One unusual vari-
able is 1/[1+days on market ] (the reciprocal of days on market
plus one).  If a listing agent realizes that the seller is highly moti-
vated to sell the property and thus expects that a quick sale may
be consummated with little effort by the selling agent, the listing
agent might concentrate efforts on also acting as the selling agent
for that property.118  This variable was included to isolate any
such effect.  To some extent, the inclusion of this variable may
reflect excessive precaution, as Sirmans, Turnbull, and Dombrow
found no statistically significant relationship between sales price
of a house and the fact that a contract for its sale was entered
into prior to the time the listing of the house was reported on the
multiple listing service.119
The primary variables of interest in this model are selling agent
specializes in selling and two brokerage firms .  Finding a negative
relationship between selling agent specializes in selling  and sales
price would support the hypothesis that selling agents secure bus-
iness through means that disadvantage their principals, the
sellers.
As a complement to the variable selling agent specializes in
selling , the model includes a variable reflecting that the listing
agent specializes in listing .  The results for that variable do not
directly bear on our hypotheses.  It is included for purposes of
symmetry in the model formulation.  Other agent-specific con-
trols whose results do not directly bear on our hypotheses are the
ln(selling agent’s participation level), i.e., the natural logarithm of
the selling agent’s level of participation (volume of transactions),
and the ln(listing agent’s participation level).120
118 Sirmans, Turnbull, and Benjamin, empirically examining a sample of house
sales in the mid-1980s, assert, “[i]ndirect evidence reveals that brokers apparently do
not systematically hold listings back from the MLS, regardless of incentives to do
so.”  C.F. Sirmans et al., The Markets for Housing and Real Estate Broker Services , 1
J. HOUSING ECON. 207, 217 (1991).  We expect that a listing agent is unlikely to
provide an unduly negative description of the property in order to limit competition
from other prospective selling agents.
119 C.F. Sirmans et al., Quick House Sales:  Seller Mistake or Luck? , 4 J. HOUSING
ECON. 230, 241 (1995).  The coefficient estimate is in fact positive, 0.009 or 0.019,
depending on the model used. Id . at 239 tbl.II (providing results estimating the
natural logarithm of the selling price).
120 Other work has yielded varying conclusions concerning the impact of the lat-
ter. See, e.g. , Jud & Winkler, supra note 90, at 291 tbl.II (finding what they describe R
as a “marginally significant,” negative relationship in one model for the listing agent
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The variable two brokerage firms  shows the estimated relation-
ship compared to the circumstance that is “held-out,” i.e., the
case for which no dummy variable is present, which is the partici-
pation of one brokerage firm where the selling agent and the list-
ing agent are different individuals.  Finding a negative estimated
coefficient for two brokerage firms  supports the hypothesis that
selling agents seek to promote the interests of buyers, but they
are restrained in doing so where the listing is with another agent
in the same firm.
Although not directly relevant to the hypotheses of this Arti-
cle, Model 1 also addresses the extent to which retaining the du-
ties of listing agent and selling agent within a single individual is
correlated with changes in the price realized by the seller.  The
listing agent and the selling agent perform different aspects of
the aggregate duties performed on behalf of the seller.  It may be
that some agents are particularly skilled in performing either the
listing agent duties or the selling agent duties.  For example,
some agents may be particularly adept at (or patient in) locating
properties that may be of interest to prospective buyers, whereas
other agents may be particularly skilled at describing the prop-
erty in promotional literature (e.g., the MLS listing).  Alterna-
tively, where the prospective selling agent is the listing agent, the
prospect of receiving both the listing and the selling commissions
may cause the agent to be more aggressive in convincing the par-
ties to agree.  That one individual performs all the agent duties
may therefore affect the price compared to sales in which two
agents in the same brokerage firm participate.  For this reason
Model 1 includes a variable reflecting the participation of a single
agent.
There is a potential criticism of this model formulation.  We do
not have data on the sharing of the commission between the sell-
ing brokerage firm and the selling agent, which may affect selling
agent performance.  Munneke and Yavas indicate that some
firms allow an agent to retain more of the fee in sales of the
firm’s own listings.121  Although Munneke and Yavas find no sta-
tistically significant relationship between sales price and the list-
sales and an insignificant relationship between sales price and selling agent sales);
Levitt & Syverson, supra  note 72, at 11 (finding a positive, statistically significant
relationship for logarithm of listing agent sales); Munneke & Yavas, supra note 75, R
at 12, 16 tbl.3 (finding no statistically significant relationship for listing agent
volume).
121 Munneke & Yavas, supra note 75, at 12. R
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ing being with a firm that allows the listing agents to keep
substantially all the listing commission,122 the nature of the split
between the selling  agent and the selling agent’s firm may influ-
ence pricing.  Yavas and Yang find no general relationship be-
tween the time a property is listed and the fact that the listing
brokerage firm is the selling brokerage firm,123 which is consis-
tent with concluding that agents do not generally make special
efforts to sell their firms’ own listings.124  In any case, this con-
cern would be limited to interpretation of the variable two bro-
kerage firms; it would not directly affect interpretation of our
other variable of interest, selling agent specializes in selling .
2. Large Firm Effects and the Interrelationship Between Firm
Size and Participation of Only One Brokerage Firm
As noted above,125 one firm, which we identify by the name
“Firm A ,” has a much greater share of the market than any other
firm.  Sales involving two agents in the same firm are more likely
to involve Firm A  than any other firm.  In the subsample of 1247
transactions involving the more homogeneous housing, Firm A
participated in 68% of the transactions involving two different
agents affiliated with the same brokerage firm.  This percentage
is materially higher than the percentage of those 1247 transac-
tions involving two different brokerage firms in which Firm A
was the listing brokerage firm (33%) and the percentage of trans-
actions involving two different brokerage firms in which Firm A
was either the listing brokerage firm or the selling brokerage firm
(56%).
Because prior work has found a positive relationship between
sales price and the size of the firm, i.e., the number of listings,
that has the listing,126 it is desirable to control separately for the
presence of the largest firm.  Model 2 controls for the participa-
tion of the largest firm in the MSA and the combination of sell-
ing agent specialization with whether the agency duties are split
122 Id.  at 16 tbl.3.
123 See  Abdullah Yavas & Shiawee Yang, The Strategic Role of Listing Price in
Marketing Real Estate:  Theory and Evidence , 23 REAL EST. ECON. 347, 363 tbl.3
(1995).
124 But cf. id.  at 363 tbl.3, 364 (finding a negative relationship for very expensive
houses).
125 See supra  note 114 and accompanying text.
126 See  William T. Hughes, Jr., Brokerage Firms’ Characteristics and the Sale of
Residential Property , 10 J. REAL EST. RES. 45, 46 (1995).
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between two firms.  Model 2 first adds variables reflecting the
capacity in which Firm A  participates: there are two firms and
one is Firm A ; two agents with Firm A  participate; and there is
one agent that participates, and that agent is with Firm A .  Model
2 also adds variables combining agent specialization and separa-
tion of duties between two firms.  These variables reflect the par-
ticipation of a selling agent who specializes in selling and either
the participation of two brokerage firms, the participation of a
single agent, or the participation of two agents in the same firm.
Model 4 estimates the same relationship that Model 2 estimates,
but it does so in the full sample.
The first of these three variables (two firms ; selling agent spe-
cializes in selling) is the variable of particular interest.  The ratio-
nale is as follows:  If selling agent specialization is associated with
lower prices, and the separation of agency duties between two
agents in different firms is associated with lower prices, we may
find that the combination of both is also associated with lower
sales prices.
3. Robustness of the Results
It is helpful to confirm the results of empirical estimations of
relationships by reestimating the relationships in slightly differ-
ent ways.  Doing so provides assurance that the results identified
are not anomalies arising from the particular specifications of the
models, i.e., reestimating the relationships confirms that the re-
sults are “robust” to alternative model specifications.
The robustness of the results is examined in two different
ways.  First, the models are reestimated excluding houses that are
less than two years old.  This eliminates new houses, which may
be marketed differently and which may have atypically informed
sellers.  Second, the models are reestimated changing the defini-
tion of agent specialization.  In these estimations, agents are clas-
sified as specializing in selling where the aggregate number of
transactions accounted for by that agent’s participation as a sell-
ing agent is greater than or equal to 0.66, and agents are classi-




The basic relationship between selling agent specialization and
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sales price is shown in Models 1 and 3 in Table 2.  For the vari-
ables of interest, the estimations in the subsample and the full
sample are qualitatively similar.  In both the subsample and the
full sample, there is a negative relationship, statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% or the 1% level, between sales price and the par-
ticipation of a selling agent who specializes in selling.  These
results support the hypothesis that selling agents retain business
by assisting buyers in ways that decrease sales prices, i.e., in ways
that adversely affect their principals.  The magnitude of the esti-
mated coefficient (0.034) is economically significant as well.  It is
35% of that of the estimated coefficient for the presence of a
garage, 0.097 (43% in the full sample).  A rough estimate of the
impact on the sales price of the participation of a selling agent
who specializes in selling is -3.3% (-4.8% in the full sample).127
The results of Model 1 set forth in Table 2 provide some evi-
dence that splitting the selling agent and listing agent duties be-
tween two firms decreases selling price.  The relationship is
statistically significant at the 10% confidence level in the subsam-
ple.  The estimated relationship with price, approximately a 2.2%
decrease in the subsample,128 is economically significant relative
to the fee charged by a broker.129
These results concerning separation of duties between two
firms thus provide some additional support for the hypothesis
that selling agents promote the interests of buyers even where
the selling agents owe fiduciary duties to sellers.  Zietz and New-
some found the opposite relationship130 in sales of medium-to-
large houses that they describe as involving “buyer’s agent[s].”131
Assuming their description of their data is accurate, one might
127 That is, 1 – e -0.034 = 0.033, and 1 – e -0.049 = 0.048 in the full sample.
128 1 – e -0.022 = 0.022.  This percentage estimate is slightly biased.  If one wished to
be hyperprecise, for an estimated coefficient for a dummy variable that is negative,
the estimated percentage change in the dependent variable arising from the dum-
myvariable being equal to one may be represented by the following expression:
1100{exp( bˆ− − Vˆ( bˆ))−1},2
where bˆ represents the estimated coefficient for the dummy variable and Vˆ(bˆ)
represents the estimate of the variance of bˆ. See  Peter E. Kennedy, Estimation with
Correctly Interpreted Dummy Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations , 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 801, 801 (1981).
129 Of course, other factors not captured in our data may contribute to the magni-
tudes of these relationships.  That is inherent in this type of model.
130 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. R
131 See supra  note 93. R
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conclude that whom an agent formally represents matters in a
rather complex way or that standards of conduct vary across
communities.  The latter interpretation could apply even if Zietz
and Newsome’s description of their data is inaccurate.  Another
possible difference involves their failure to control for firm
size,132 which we do control for in Models 2 and 4.
2. Controlling for Firm Size
Models 2 and 4 control for firm size by including three vari-
ables reflecting the participation of Firm A,  based on whether
two firms, one being Firm A , participate; whether one agent par-
ticipates, and that individual is with Firm A ; and whether two
agents, both with Firm A , participate.  We are interested in
whether, after controlling for the capacity in which the largest
firm participates, selling agent specialization is negatively related
to sales price.  In both the full sample and the subsample, the
coefficient estimate for the variable reflecting the participation of
two brokerage firms is not statistically significant.  The estimated
magnitude of each also has decreased materially.  In fact, the sign
of the relationship changes in the full sample.  This does not
mean that there is not a general relationship between splitting
brokerage duties between two firms and sales price.  It merely
means that the confidence interval includes zero, and we there-
fore cannot reject the hypothesis that there is not a relationship.
Of particular interest, however, are the results of interacting
selling agent specialization with the three categories of types of
agency representation (two firms, one agent, or two agents with
the same firm).  There is a negative, statistically significant rela-
tionship between the logarithm of sales price and the participa-
tion of a selling agent who specializes in selling when the listing
agent is with a different firm.  That is the case in both the full
sample and the subsample.  On the other hand, we do not find a
statistically significant relationship between the logarithm of
sales price and the participation of a specialized selling agent
when the listing agent is another person in the same firm.  In the
full sample, the difference in the coefficients of two firms ; selling
agent specializes in selling  and two agents , one firm ; selling agent
132 See Zietz & Newsome, supra  note 74, at 170-71 exhibit 1 (not including vari- R
ables reflecting brokerage firm size in exhibit providing variable definitions and ba-
sic statistics).
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specializes in selling  is statistically significant.133
In sum, after controlling large firm effects, we find selling
agent specialization is associated with lower sales prices where
the selling agent and the listing agent are with different firms.
The results support our hypothesis that to secure business, selling
agents who are fiduciaries of sellers use actions that decrease the
returns to their principals, with some evidence that the participa-
tion of a listing agent in the same firm as the selling agent par-
tially restrains this activity.134
3. Robustness of the Results
The robustness of our results to alternative model specifica-
tions can be reviewed by examining the results presented in Ta-
bles 3 and 4.  Table 3 presents results estimated in subsamples
that exclude houses that are less than two years old.  Table 4
presents results using an alternative definition of agent speciali-
zation.  In Table 4, an agent is categorized as specializing in sell-
ing if at least 66% of that agent’s participation level arises from
selling, and an agent is categorized as specializing in listing if no
more than 34% of that agent’s participation level arises from
selling.
The results for the variables of interest in Tables 3 and 4 are
qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.  Of minor note is the fact
that the separation of agency duties between two firms (two
firms) becomes significant at the 10% level in the full sample
(Model 3) as well as the subsample (Model 1); that is, the results
are somewhat stronger.  In addition, the significance of listing
agent specialization—a variable not directly bearing on our hy-
potheses—is sensitive to the definition of specialization.  In gen-
eral, however, Tables 3 and 4 indicate that our results of interest
are not produced by anomalies in the marketing of new houses,
and they are not produced by the particular definition of agent
specialization.
133 The p-value for rejecting equality is 0.02.
134 One might be interested in the economic significance of this variable relative
to the participation of Firm A.  A rough estimate can be derived from the results for
Model 2 for transactions in the subsample of more homogeneous housing.  That
model predicts that the participation of a selling agent who specializes as a selling
agent involving two different brokerage firms is associated with an estimated 3.6%
decrease in the sales price (which is computed as follows: e -0.037 – 1 = –0.0363).  The
estimated magnitude of the impact that the participation of Firm A has on sales
price in a transaction involving two different brokerage firms is slightly smaller—a
3.0% increase in sales price (e 0.030 – 1 = 0.0305).
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CONCLUSION
A recent working paper identifies agency problems in the resi-
dential real estate market, finding higher sales prices for houses
owned by the agents themselves.135  This Article examines more
subtle agency problems: whether real estate agents secure busi-
ness by acting contrary to the interests of their principals and
whether division of duties between two firms affects agent
performance.
For this purpose, we examine sales prices of houses in an MSA
within a jurisdiction that followed the traditional rule under
which selling agents and listing agents are fiduciaries of the sell-
ers unless there is an agreement to the contrary (and where
deviation from that default was rare).  We hypothesize that devi-
ations from duties owed to sellers may assist selling agents in se-
curing business.  We test this hypothesis by examining whether
the participation of a selling agent who specializes in selling is
associated with a lower sales price.  We also hypothesize that in-
trafirm relationships may limit agent misconduct better than in-
terfirm relationships.  We test this hypothesis by examining
whether a seller receives a better sales price when the selling
agent is with the same firm as the listing agent.
We find that sellers receive lower prices when the selling
agents specialize in selling.  There is some evidence that the ef-
fect is particularly pronounced when selling agent duties are split
between two firms.  The results support the view that to secure
business, selling agents use actions that decrease the returns to
their principals, with some evidence that the participation of a
listing agent in the same firm as the selling agent partially re-
strains this activity.
States generally now require some form of disclosure of the
nature of agents’ obligations in the sale of residential real es-
tate.136  Our results support skepticism concerning the efficacy of
those obligations.  The results suggest that in various ways,
agents formally owing obligations to sellers were acting in ways
that benefited buyers.  Mandating enhanced disclosure of duties
formally owed may be counterproductive if, as suggested by our
results, duties formally owed do not fully dictate agent conduct.
Our results are also relevant to assessing the traditional sub-
135 See supra  note 72 and accompanying text.
136 See supra  note 65 and accompanying text. R
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agency relationship for selling brokerage firms.  The results sug-
gest agency problems can have economically significant
consequences to principals in these jurisdictions.  Appropriate
responses to this concern could involve enhanced regulatory en-
forcement and, as has occurred in some jurisdictions, modifica-
tion of the duties to restrict fiduciary obligations.
TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS
Summary statistics for 1247 transactions in one of six specified MLS areas (the
subsample) and for all 3209 transactions for which complete data are available (the full
sample).
Subsample Full Sample
1247 Transactions 3209 Transactions
mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
Price 113,806 51,296 111,528 71,387
Age (years) 15.3 13.3 15.0 16.1
Living area (square feet) 1961 613 1882 664
Days on market 66.7 77.8 72.4 80.6
Selling agent’s participation level 18.6 16.5 22.3 29.3
Listing agent’s participation level 25.4 23.5 30.5 36.5
mean freq. mean freq.
Fireplace 0.767 956 0.701 2248
Tenant 0.038 48 0.048 153
No air 0.000 0 0.009 28
No heat 0.009 11 0.033 106
Carport 0.770 960 0.740 2375
Garage 0.214 267 0.201 644
Two brokerage firms 0.529 660 0.497 1594
One agent 0.201 251 0.243 779
Selling agent specializes in selling 0.196 245 0.211 678
Listing agent specializes in listing 0.133 166 0.151 483
Two firms, Firm A  participates 0.298 371 0.234 750
Two agents, both with Firm A 0.183 228 0.128 410
One agent with Firm A  participates 0.059 73 0.056 181
Selling agent specializes in selling and:
two firms 0.136 169 0.141 454
one agent 0.010 12 0.012 40
two agents, one firm 0.051 64 0.057 184
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TABLE 2—REGRESSION RESULTS ESTIMATING NATURAL LOG
OF SALES PRICE
Ordinary least squares regressions of natural logarithm of dwelling sales price (t-statistics
computed using Huber/White robust standard errors in brackets under coefficients; scale factors
for certain variable coefficients in brackets under corresponding variable name; ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively).
1247 sales (subsample) 3209 sales
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 10.583 10.578 10.438 10.427
[229.37]*** [211.82]*** [282.04]*** [281.15]***
Age -0.019 -0.019 -0.013 -0.013
[12.09]*** [12.12]*** [10.26]*** [10.77]***
Age2 2.210 2.233 1.051 1.097
[x104] [5.98]*** [5.99]*** [4.69]*** [4.88]***
Living area 5.178 5.169 5.523 5.460
[x10-4] [33.01]*** [32.86]*** [33.18]*** [32.48]***
Days on market -6.015 -6.129 -3.599 -3.659
[x10-5] [0.70] [0.72] [0.30] [0.31]
1/[1 + days on market] 0.048 0.049 0.074 0.074
[1.90]* [1.99]** [3.22]*** [3.29]***
Fireplace 0.045 0.046 0.093 0.090
[2.82]*** [2.88]*** [6.60]*** [6.47]***
Tenant -0.048 -0.047 -0.068 -0.070
[1.53] [1.53] [2.42]** [2.53]**
No heat -0.221 -0.234 -0.280 -0.282
[2.40]** [2.60]*** [6.55]*** [6.57]***
No air -0.434 -0.417
[4.08]*** [3.85]***
Carport 0.089 0.088 0.052 0.049
[3.15]*** [3.16]*** [2.66]*** [2.56]**
Garage 0.097 0.098 0.114 0.112
[3.48]*** [3.56]*** [5.40]*** [5.35]***
Two firms -0.022 -0.013 -0.015 0.011
[1.74]* [0.51] [1.41] [0.75]
One agent -0.018 -0.006 -0.037 0.000
[1.16] [0.24] [2.53]** [0.01]
In(selling agent’s participation level) 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004
[0.94] [0.68] [0.91] [0.76]
ln(listing agent’s participation level) 0.012 0.009 0.014 0.012
[2.11]** [1.52] [3.20]*** [2.64]***
Selling agent specializes in selling -0.034 -0.049
[2.42]** [3.93]***
Listing agent specializes in listing 0.015 0.023
[1.09] [1.96]*
Two firms; Firm A  participates 0.030 0.054
[2.14]** [4.36]***
Two agents, both with Firm A 0.033 0.079
[1.40] [4.40]***
One agent, with Firm A 0.048 0.043
[1.93]* [1.81]*
Two firms; selling agent specializes -0.037 -0.062
in selling [2.25]** [4.27]***
One agent; selling agent specializes -0.057 -0.068
in selling [1.23] [1.81]*
Two agents, one firm; selling agent -0.016 -0.003
specializes in selling [0.54] [0.13]
R2 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.77
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TABLE 3—REGRESSION RESULTS ESTIMATING NATURAL LOG
OF SALES PRICE OF HOUSES AT LEAST TWO
YEARS OLD
Ordinary least squares regressions of natural logarithm of dwelling sales price (t-statistics
computed using Huber/White robust standard errors in brackets under coefficients; scale factors
for certain variable coefficients in brackets under corresponding variable name; ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively).
1018 sales (subsample) 2415 sales
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 10.535 10.528 10.363 10.358
[213.64]*** [199.68]*** [251.11]*** [249.53]***
Age -0.015 -0.015 -0.008 -0.008
[8.18]*** [8.21]*** [6.23]*** [6.58]***
Age2 1.796 1.809 0.632 0.663
[x10-4] [4.94]*** [4.96]*** [3.42]*** [3.58]***
living area 5.077 5.072 5.311 5.269
[x10-4] [31.07]*** [31.15]*** [28.22]*** [27.76]***
Days on market -24.575 -23.415 -21.069 -19.895
[x10-5] [1.98]** [1.87]* [1.13] [1.07]
1/[1 + days on market] 0.044 0.051 0.065 0.068
[1.10] [1.29] [1.81]* [1.88]*
Fireplace 0.059 0.060 0.115 0.113
[3.71]*** [3.78]*** [7.43]*** [7.39]***
Tenant -0.046 -0.045 -0.061 -0.063
[1.54] [1.51] [2.19]** [2.28]**
No heat -0.272 -0.285 -0.298 -0.300
[3.07]*** [3.30]*** [7.00]*** [6.98]***
No air -0.431 -0.414
[3.96]*** [3.74]***
Carport 0.096 0.095 0.067 0.064
[3.25]*** [3.28]*** [3.26]*** [3.15]***
Garage 0.115 0.114 0.120 0.116
[3.92]*** [3.95]*** [5.33]*** [5.21]***
Two firms -0.025 -0.019 -0.024 -0.003
[1.75]* [0.67] [1.90]* [0.15]
One agent -0.024 -0.015 -0.064 -0.036
[1.31] [0.49] [3.47]*** [1.47]
ln(selling agent’s participation level) 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006
[1.15] [0.87] [1.14] [0.88]
ln(listing agent’s participation level) 0.013 0.010 0.019 0.015
[2.14]** [1.59] [3.50]*** [2.77]***
Selling agent specializes in selling -0.035 -0.053
[2.22]** [3.66]***
Listing agent specializes in listing 0.016 0.031
[0.96] [1.84]*
Two firms; Firm A  participates 0.034 0.052
[2.19]** [3.57]***
Two agents, both with Firm A 0.032 0.064
[1.20] [2.95]***
One agent, with Firm A 0.050 0.047
[1.61] [1.56]
Two firms; selling agent specializes -0.037 -0.069
in Selling [2.00]** [4.06]***
One agent; selling agent specializes -0.062 -0.054
in Selling [1.23] [1.34]
Two agents, one firm; selling agent -0.016 -0.010
specializes in selling [0.46] [0.37]
R2 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.75
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TABLE 4—REGRESSION RESULTS ESTIMATING NATURAL LOG
OF SALES PRICE USING MODIFIED DEFINITION OF
AGENT SPECIALIZATION
Ordinary least squares regressions of natural logarithm of dwelling sales price (t-statistics
computed using Huber/White robust standard errors in brackets under coefficients; scale factors
for certain variable coefficients in brackets under corresponding variable name; ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively).
1247 sales (subsample) 3209 sales
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 10.614 10.594 10.480 10.444
[232.65]*** [215.78]*** [285.97]*** [283.71]***
Age -0.018 -0.018 -0.013 -0.013
[12.19]*** [12.24]*** [10.45]*** [10.74]***
Age2 2.202 2.219 1.058 1.080
[x10-4] [6.09]*** [6.22]*** [4.78]*** [4.89]***
Living area 5.162 5.150 5.501 5.441
[x10-4] [32.78]*** [32.69]*** [33.01]*** [32.36]***
Days on market -5.194 -5.968 -2.999 -3.866
[x10-5] [0.61] [0.70] [0.25] [0.33]
1/[1 + days on market] 0.051 0.053 0.076 0.076
[2.02]** [2.12]** [3.32]*** [3.35]***
Fireplace 0.045 0.047 0.091 0.089
[2.81]*** [2.91]*** [6.51]*** [6.48]***
Tenant -0.050 -0.052 -0.072 -0.072
[1.61] [1.72]* [2.55]** [2.61]***
No heat -0.222 -0.236 -0.281 -0.281
[2.47]** [2.70]*** [6.53]*** [6.54]***
No air -0.432 -0.423
[3.99]*** [3.89]***
Carport 0.087 0.087 0.052 0.050
[3.13]*** [3.14]*** [2.71]*** [2.63]***
Garage 0.093 0.095 0.113 0.112
[3.37]*** [3.49]*** [5.36]*** [5.38]***
Two firms -0.023 -0.004 -0.018 0.022
[1.79]* [0.18] [1.70]* [1.40]
One agent -0.025 0.001 -0.051 -0.003
[1.63] [0.04] [3.50]*** [0.15]
ln(selling agent’s participation level) 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000
[0.39] [0.18] [0.23] [0.03]
ln(listing agent’s participation level) 0.011 0.008 0.014 0.012
[1.86]* [1.39] [3.08]*** [2.81]***
Selling agent specializes in selling—
alt. def’n -0.048 -0.068
[3.74]*** [6.10]***
Listing agent specializes in listing—
alt. def’n 0.000 -0.007
[0.02] [0.76]
Two firms; Firm A  participates 0.030 0.049
[2.13]** [4.04]***
Two agents, both with Firm A 0.034 0.077
[1.45] [4.31]***
One agent, with Firm A 0.047 0.042
[1.88]* [1.76]*
Two firms; selling agent specializes -0.052 -0.083
in selling—alt. def’n [3.41]*** [6.14]***
One agent; selling agent specializes -0.094 -0.062
in selling—alt. def’n [2.72]*** [2.32]**
Two agents, one firm; selling agent -0.018 -0.020
specializes in selling—alt. def’n [0.79] [1.12]
R2 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.77
